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CIVIL RIGHTS/CIVIL PROCEDURE-Is IT THE OFFICER OR 
THE GENTLEMAN?: ISSUES OF CAPACITY IN § 1983 ACTIONS 
BROUGHT IN FEDERAL COURT 
INTRODUCTION 
Robert Biggs had been vomiting every night for sixteen 
nights.! He had yet to receive the new medication that the prison 
psychiatrist had prescribed for him more than two weeks before.2 
He had been told that the prison did not have any of the medication 
available and it would have to be ordered from another prison's 
pharmacy. The medicine arrived ten days after the prescription was 
written-unfortunately for Mr. Biggs, it arrived on the last working 
day before Christmas.3 Six more days passed before Biggs received 
the proper medication.4 
Biggs filed two grievances, both of which were denied, and 
eventually filed a pro se suit against various prison officials, includ­
ing the superintendent and the prison nurse.S He alleged that the 
defendants had acted with deliberate indifference to his medical 
needs and, in so doing, had violated his rights under the Eighth and 
Fourteenth Amendments to the Constitution.6 He brought his suit 
pursuant to 42 U.S.c. § 1983, which provides a federal cause of ac­
tion against any person who violates the federal rights of another 
while acting under the color of state law.7 He sought compensatory 






7. Section 1983 provides in relevant part, 

Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, 

or usage, of any State or Territory or the District of Columbia, subjects, or 

causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United States or other person within 

the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights, privileges, or immuni­

ties secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the party injured in 

an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress .... 

42 U.S.c. § 1983 (2000). 
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damages for suffering caused by the denial of proper medical 
treatment.8 
The district court dismissed his complaint.9 Biggs's pleading 
was unclear as to whether he was suing the prison officials in their 
official or personal capacities. Applying a presumption that § 1983 
defendants are sued only in their official capacities unless the com­
plaint clearly states otherwise (hereinafter the "bright-line" ap­
proach), the court ruled that the Eleventh Amendment to the 
Constitution bars all claims for damages against state agents sued in 
their official capacities.10 
Biggs appealed the dismissal.H In deciding his claim of error, 
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit could, on the one 
hand, agree with the district court and uphold the official-capacity 
presumption, thereby aligning itself with the Eighth and Sixth Cir­
cuitsP Alternatively, it could, like the majority of federal courts of 
appeals, adopt a less stringent approach, looking instead to the na­
ture of the claims made, the defenses raised, and the course of the 
proceedings (hereinafter the "course-of-proceedings"13 approach) 
to make a determination of the capacity in which the defendants 
were sued.14 
The Fourth Circuit adopted the majority position and reversed 
the dismissal of Biggs's claim;15 but the choice it faced is one that 
places two fundamental interests in tension. The first is that the 
federal system is set up to ensure that, whenever possible, claims 
are litigated on their merits, rather than disposed of on procedural 
grounds.16 On the other hand, federal courts are courts of limited 
8. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 58. 
9. Id. 
10. Id. 
11. Id. at 59. 
12. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1989); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 
(6th Cir. 1989). 
13. As used in this context, the term appears to come from the Supreme Court's 
decision in Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464 (1985). There, the plaintiff's initial pleading 
was filed prior to the Court's decision in Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of 
New York, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), partially overruling its holding in Monroe v. Pape, 365 
U.S. 167 (1961). In explaining the resulting discrepancies in the complaint when viewed 
through a post-Monell lens, the Court stated, "The course of proceedings after Monell 
was decided did, however, make it abundantly clear that the action against [Defendant] 
was in his official capacity and only in that capacity." Brandon, 469 U.S. at 469. 
14. See, e.g., Frank v. Relin, 1 F.3d 1317, 1326 (2d Cir. 1993); Houston v. Reich, 
932 F.2d 883, 885 (10th Cir. 1991); Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990); 
Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1987). 
15. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 60. 
16. See FED. R. CIV. P. 1; Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944). 
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jurisdiction and have no power to entertain matters that fall outside 
the scope of authority granted by the Constitution and Congress.17 
From the point of view of the bright-line courts, an explicit 
statement that a § 1983 defendant is being sued individually is re­
quired because the Eleventh Amendment removes official-capacity 
claims from the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts.IS 
From the countervailing perspective, this is a misunderstanding of 
the nature of federal jurisdiction and a state's immunity from suit,19 
Both sides agree that neither a state nor its officials can be sued for 
damages. Both sides agree that a § 1983 plaintiff should make clear 
in his complaint that his suit is brought against the defendant offi­
cial in his or her individual capacity. 
But the simple fact is that complaints are often unclear. Are 
those who leave capacity ambiguous to be denied the opportunity 
to litigate their rights? On the other hand, should a federal court be 
permitted to entertain a case over which its jurisdiction is not ap­
parent from the outset? 
These questions, and the approaches taken by the U.S. courts 
of appeals in trying to resolve them, are the focus of this Note. Part 
I will set out the major points of the Supreme Court's jurisprudence 
regarding the Eleventh Amendment. Part II traces the progress of 
the more relevant § 1983 precedents delivered by the Court. Part 
III details the bases of the majority and minority positions regard­
ing the necessity of specific pleading of capacity. Finally, Part IV 
examines the majority and minority positions in light of the hold­
ings and statements of the Supreme Court relative to this issue and 
ultimately concludes that both the majority and minority ap­
proaches are unsatisfactory. Instead, this Note suggests, the best 
approach involves a substantive reading of the complaint to deter­
mine whether the defendant has been sued individually or officially. 
The inquiry should be limited to the four corners of the complaint, 
but should not hinge on the inclusion of certain magic words or 
phrases. 
It should further be noted at the outset that the Eleventh 
Amendment and § 1983 are two immense areas of federal law, re­
plete with any number of judicial fictions, inconsistencies and out­
right contradictions. The intricacies of either subject are beyond 
17. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL, MARY KAY KANE & ARTHUR R. MILLER, CIVIL 
PROCEDURE § 2.2 (3d ed. 1999); ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION § 3.1 
(3d ed. 1999). 
18. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989). 
19. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 60. 
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the scope of this Note and have been well examined elsewhere.20 
The discussion of them here is simply to provide background for the 
question at hand, rather than attempt to resolve the attendant and 
lingering questions. 
I. THE ELEVENTH AMENDMENT 
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to 
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted 
against one of the United States by Citizens of another State, or 
by Citizens or Subjects of any Foreign State.21 
In 1793, in one of its earliest en banc decisions, the U.S. Su­
preme Court ruled that a resident of South Carolina could sue the 
State of Georgia for recovery of Revolutionary War debts.22 The 
states adamantly resisted the decision,23 and within a year the Elev­
enth Amendment was drafted and submitted to the states specifi­
cally to overrule the Court.24 
The Amendment, by its terms, alters the grant of authority 
contained in Article III, § 2 of the Constitution.25 It removes from 
20. See generally William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh 
Amendment: A Narrow Construction ofan Affirmative Grant ofJurisdiction Rather than 
a Prohibition Against Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REv. 1033 (1983); Carlos Manuel Vaz­
quez, What is Eleventh Amendment Immunity?, 106 YALE L.J. 1683 (1997); Vicki C. 
Jackson, The Supreme Court, The Eleventh Amendment, and State Sovereign Immunity, 
98 YALE L.J. 1 (1988); William Burnham, "Beam Me Up, There's No Intelligent Life 
Here": A Dialogue on the Eleventh Amendment with Lawyers from Mars, 75 NEB. L. 
REV. 551 (1996); John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 
1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47 (1998); Mark R. Brown, The Failure of Fault Under § 1983: 
Municipal Liability for State Law Enforcement, 84 CORNELL L. REV. 1503 (1999); 
Christopher J. Pettit, The Evolution ofGovernment Liability Under Section 1983, 24 ST. 
MARY's L.J. 145 (1992); Gloria Jean Rottell, Paying the Price: It's Time to Hold Munici­
palities Liable for Punitive Damages Under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, 10 J.L. & POL'y 189 
(2001). 
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
22. Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793). 
23. In Georgia, for example, the state House of Representatives passed a bill pro­
viding that anyone who tried to enforce the judgment would be '''guilty of a felony, and 
shall suffer death, without the benefit of clergy, by being hanged.''' Fletcher, supra note 
20, at 1058 (quoting AUGUSTA CHRONICLE, Nov. 23, 1793). 
24. U.S. CaNST. amend. XI, Historical Notes, in 1 U.S.c. at LXIII (2000). The 
Amendment was submitted to the states on March 4, 1794 and ten states ratified it the 
same year. [d. It was declared to be ratified by three quarters of the states on Jan. 8, 
1798.ld. 
25. Art. III, § 2, cl. 1 provides: 

The judicial Power shall extend to all cases, in Law and Equity, arising under 

this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which 

shall be made, under their Authority;-to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, 
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the jurisdiction of the federal courts any suits commenced against a 
state by a citizen of another state, or by any foreign citizen or sub­
ject. Since at least 1890, however, the Supreme Court has given the 
Amendment a reading much broader than its terms, treating it as a 
textual reflection of the common law doctrine of sovereign 
immunity.26 
Accordingly, the Court has indicated that sovereign immunity 
is a bedrock principle, incorporated in the very structure of the 
Constitution.27 That is, the principle predates the Constitution and 
so can be fairly read into the framework of that document.28 Its 
supporters contend that state governments, and state treasuries, 
need to be protected against the financial drain that would result 
other public Ministers and Consuls;-to all Cases of admiralty and maritime 
jurisdiction;-to Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; ­
to Controversies between two or more States;-between a State and Citizens of 
another State;-between Citizens of different States;-between Citizens of the 
same State claiming Lands under the Grants of different States and between a 
State, or the Citizens thereof;-and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects. 
(emphasis added to indicate the affected language). 
26. See Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). This doctrine, a holdover from En­
glish common law, held that the king could not be sued in his own courts. Sovereignty 
was manifest in the person of the King. An incident of that sovereignty was immunity 
from suit. As stated in Blackstone's Commentaries: 
[F]irst, the law ascribes to the king the attribute of sovereignty, or pre-emi­
nence. 'Rex est vicarius ... et minister Dei in terra: omnis quidem sub eo est, et 
ipse sub nul/o, nisi tantum sub Deo (The king is the vicegerent [sic] and minis­
ter of God on earth: all are subject to him; and he is subject to none but God 
alone)'.... Hence it is, that no suit or action can be brought against the king, 
even in civil matters, because no court can have jurisdiction over him. 
WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 1 COMMENTARIES *241-42. Blackstone goes on to write that "if 
any person has ... a just demand upon the king, he must petition him to his court of 
chancery, where his chancellor will administer right as a matter of grace, though not 
upon compulsion." Id. at *243. This was seen as a matter of natural law since "[a] 
subject ... so long as he continues a subject, hath no way to oblige his prince to give 
him his due ... though no wise prince will ever refuse to stand a lawful contract." Id. at 
*243-44. 
27. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,713 (1999). 

We have ... sometimes referred to the States' immunity from suit as 'Eleventh 

Amendment immunity.' The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of 

a misnomer, for the sovereign immunity of the States neither derives from, nor 

is limited by, the terms of the Eleventh Amendment. Rather ... the States' 

immunity from suit is a fundamental aspect of the sovereignty which the 

States' enjoyed before the ratification of the Constitution, and which they re­





Id.; see ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES 179 
(2d ed. 2002). 
28. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 180. 
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from damage judgments entered against them.29 Those who would 
do away with the doctrine contend that it has no support in the 
words of the Constitution and was not something intended to be 
adopted by the Framers.3D This argument reasons that broad state 
immunity from suit makes it impossible for a wronged citizen to 
recover when the state infringes on her rights; that a citizen may be 
deprived of life, liberty or property by a state and have no forum 
for redress. 
The debate, to a certain extent, is over trust. The defenders of 
sovereign immunity believe that the doctrine places an appropriate 
faith in government to do right. Detractors argue that history and 
human nature renders such trust ill-founded.31 As the Eleventh 
Amendment and sovereign immunity play a significant role in the 
debate over pleading requirements for § 1983 plaintiffs, a review of 
some of the fundamental principles in this area is appropriate. 
A. 	 Expansion of the Amendment Beyond its Terms: Hans v. 
Louisiana 
Whatever one may think of it, the Eleventh Amendment has 
been interpreted as a bar to all private suits against the states. This 
is so whether the claim is brought under the federal courts' diversity 
jurisdiction, or their jurisdiction over questions of federal law. In 
Hans v. Louisiana, the Court recognized that the Amendment did 
not itself prohibit private suits against a state by its own citizens.32 
Nevertheless, the Court believed that it would have been absurd for 
Congress to have intended to bar suits against states by out-of-state 
residents and aliens, but still permit such suits by in-state re­
sidents.33 Dealing squarely with the question of whether a state 
may be sued in federal court by one of its own citizens under the 
court's federal question jurisdiction, the Court stated that an affirm­
ative answer would give satisfaction to "an attempt to strain the 
Constitution and the law to a construction never imagined or 




32. 134 u.s. 1 (1890). 
33. Id. at 15; see also Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1039. 
34. Hans, 134 U.S. at 15. In making this assertion, the Court was referring to 
passages from Hamilton's Federalist No. 81 and from the responses of Madison and 
Marshall to the objections of Patrick Henry and George Mason to the language of Arti­
cle III extending the judicial power to "controversies between a state and citizens of 
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enth Amendment should be construed on its terms, the Court re­
fused to so limit its scope, declaring, "[t]he suability of a State 
without its consent was a thing unknown to the law."35 
For the Hans Court, neither the Eleventh Amendment, nor the 
original text of Article III, could be read to allow a cause of action 
to be maintained against a state by an individual, regardless of the 
individual's in-state status, where the state had not consented to be 
sued.36 Since Hans, the Court has held to this interpretation.37 In 
fact, the Court has extended the prohibition to suits in admiralty 
and to suits commenced by foreign nations against the states.38 
another state" and "between a state ... and foreign ... citizens or subjects." U.S. 
CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The Court quotes Hamilton's statement that 
[i]t is inherent in the nature of sovereignty not to be amenable to the suit of an 
individual without its consent. This is the general sense and the general prac­
tice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the attributes of sovereignty, is 
now enjoyed by the government of every State in the Union. 
Hans, 134 U.S. at 13. The Court further quotes Madison's response to Henry and Ma­
son at the Virginia ratifying convention: 
[The federal jurisdiction] in controversies between a State and citizens of an­
other State is much objected to, and perhaps without reason. It is not in the 
power of individuals to call any State into court. ... It appears to me that this 
[clause] can have no operation but this-to give a citizen a right to be heard in 
the federal courts; and if a State should condescend to be a party, this court 
may take cognizance of it. 
Id. at 14. Marshall is quoted in the same vein: 
I hope that no gentleman will think that a State will be called at the bar of a 
federal court .... It is not rational to suppose that the sovereign power should 
be dragged before a court. The intent is to enable States to recover claims of 
individuals residing in other States. 
Id. 
35. Hans, 134 U.S. at 16. 
36. See id. at 12 (citing with approval Justice Iredell's dissenting opInIOn in 
Chisholm arguing that the Constitution was not intended to provide for "new and un­
heard of remedies, by subjecting sovereign states to actions at the suit of individuals"). 
37. See, e.g., Fed. Maritime Comm'n v. S.c. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 754 
(2002); Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida., 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996); Blatchford v. Native 
Village of Noatak, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991); Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halder­
man, 465 U.S. 89, 98 (1984); Monaco v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934); Wil­
liams v. United States, 289 U.S. 553, 575-77 (1933). 
38. Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1040 (citing Ex parte New York., No.1, 256 U.S. 
490 (1921), and Monaco, 292 U.S. at 313). Justice Scalia in 1989 wrote of the Hans 
decision, 
What we said ... was, essentially, that the Eleventh Amendment was impor­
tant not merely for what it said, but for what it reflected: a consensus that the 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, for States as well as for the Federal Govern­
ment, was part of the understood background against which the Constitution 
was adopted, and which its jurisdictional provisions did not mean to sweep 
away. 
Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 31-32 (1989) (Scalia, J., concurring in part, 
dissenting in part). 
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Nevertheless, the Eleventh Amendment, at least as inter­
preted, has been thought by many to be contrary to this country's 
founding ideal of government bound by the rule of law.39 Perhaps 
because of this tension, a number of mechanisms have developed to 
get around the Amendment's prohibitions and to try to ensure the 
rights of individuals and the compliance of states with federallaw.40 
The Supreme Court has allowed: (1) suits to be maintained against 
state officers; (2) states to waive immunity and consent to suit; and 
(3) Congress to abrogate Eleventh Amendment immunity by stat­
ute in certain circumstances.41 
B. Avoiding the Amendment 
1. The Ex parte Young Doctrine 
The maintenance of a suit against a state officer without run­
ning afoul of the Eleventh Amendment is made possible by the 
Court's decision in Ex parte Young.42 There, the Court held that a 
suit commenced against the Attorney General of Minnesota to en­
join him from enforcing a possibly unconstitutional Minnesota stat­
ute was not a suit against the state itself and so was not barred by 
the Eleventh Amendment.43 Since the relief sought would operate 
solely against Young as Attorney General, and since Young was the 
officer charged with the enforcement of the Act, the Court rea­
soned that this was not a circumstance in which the state was the 
real party in interest, and allowed the sought after relief against 
Young.44 
39. See, e.g., Vazquez, supra note 20, at 1685-86 ("The Eleventh Amendment has 
long been regarded as an embarrassment to the United States' aspirations to be a gov­
ernment of laws and not of men.... [T)he Amendment is in substantial tension with the 
rule-of-Iaw axiom that for every federal right there must be a remedy enforceable in 
federal court."); Fletcher, supra note 20, at 1040-41 ("[A) broad constitutional prohibi­
tion against suing states in federal court is unworkable in a federal system premised in 
important part on controlling state behavior by federal law in order to protect private 
individuals."). 
40. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 180. 
41. Id. 
42. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908). 
43. Id. at 159. 
The act to be enforced is alleged to be unconstitutional, and if it be so, the use 
of the name of the State to enforce an unconstitutional act to the injury of the 
complainants is a proceeding without the authority of and one which does not 
affect the State in its sovereign or governmental capacity. It is simply an ille­
gal act on the part of a state official .... 
/d. 
44. Id. at 154-55. "[T)he State might be the real party ... when the relief sought 
enures to it alone ...." Id. at 155. "[I)t is plain that such officer must have some 
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The doctrine of Ex parte Young has been widely championed 
as an indispensable means of preventing the states from trampling 
on the constitutional rights of their citizens.45 However, it is 
founded on the fiction that a state officer executing the duties of his 
office is somehow separate from the state as an entity.46 A state, 
after all, can only act through its officers and other agents.47 
The inherent fiction of Young has led at least one commentator 
to describe the principle as "unsatisfactory" and doctrinally "un­
tidy."48 Nevertheless, the Young principle does provide "considera­
ble federal judicial control over state behavior and permits 
generally effective remedies against wrongful acts of state 
officers."49 
Under the Young doctrine, prospective injunctive relief, when 
sought against a state official, is not barred by the Eleventh 
Amendment. Likewise, injunctive relief is not barred even when 
compliance with the injunction will lead to funds being expended 
from the state treasury. 50 What is categorically not permitted, and 
where the Supreme Court appears to have hung its hat for the time 
being, are suits seeking retrospective monetary relief.51 It does not 
matter whether these suits are for damages or equitable restitu­
connection with the enforcement of the act, or else it is merely making him a party as a 
representative of the State, and thereby attempting to make the State a party." Id. at 
157. 
45. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 200. 
46. See id. at 201. 
47. The Young fiction also gives rise to a further question: if, under Young, a state 
officer is stripped of authority when attempting to enforce an unconstitutional law, is 
there still state action as required for there to be a violation of the Fourteenth Amend­
ment? In such circumstances, the Court has held that the conduct of a state officer that 
is not entitled to Eleventh Amendment protection is still state action for purposes of 
the Fourteenth Amendment. See Home Telephone Co. and Telegraph v. Los Angeles, 
227 U.S. 278, 285 (1913); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 201-02. 
48. Fletcher, supra note 20, 1041. Professor Fletcher notes, 

[W]hen the dominant form of relief against state officers was the negative in­

junction, it was generally feasible to distinguish between permitted injunctions 

that merely required cessation of certain official behavior and forbidden dam­
age awards against state officers .... In the last thirty years however, when 
affirmative injunctions against state officers have become relatively common 
and when damage awards against state officers are available under certain cir­
cumstances, the Court has expanded considerably the potential range of appli­
cation of the Ex parte Young fiction. 
Id. 
49. Id. 
50. 2 RODNEY A. SMOLLA, FEDERAL CIVIL RIGHTS Acrs § 14:72 (3d ed. 2001) 
(citing Cory v. White, 457 U.S. 85 (1982); Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267 (1977); 
Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651 (1974); Graham v. Richardson, 403 U.S. 365 (1971». 
51. Edelman, 415 U.S. at 668-69. 
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tion.52 Nor does it matter whether the state is being sued directly or 
indirectly through a state official sued in his official capacity.53 So, 
while the Young doctrine helps to some degree with the problems 
raised by the Eleventh Amendment, the Amendment still provides 
a blanket protection to states in situations where retrospective re­
lief is the only appropriate option. 54 
2. State Consent or Waiver 
In addition to situations in which the Young doctrine may be 
applied, the prohibitions of the Eleventh Amendment may be 
avoided if a state consents to suit.55 This is where, from a jurisdic­
tional standpoint, the Eleventh Amendment occupies an area 
unique to itself. In general, restrictions on the subject-matter juris­
diction of the federal courts cannot be "waived" by either party, nor 
can the parties consent to having the case adjudicated in the federal 
forum when that forum otherwise lacks jurisdiction.56 
If the Eleventh Amendment is viewed as a jurisdictional bar, it 
seems discordant with the principles underlying the limitation of ju­
dicial power to allow the bar to be removed by the consent of a 
party.57 This apparent inconsistency notwithstanding, however, "if 
a State waives its immunity and consents to suit in federal court, the 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar the action."58 Here the Elev­
enth Amendment's relation to the common law doctrine of sover­
eign immunity becomes clear, as it was historically the prerogative 
of the sovereign to consent to answer and defend a suit in his 
courts.59 
52. Id. 
53. SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 14:71. 
54. See Vazquez, supra note 20, at 1686. 
[The] narrowing of the sphere of the Amendment's practical operation does 
not dispose of the rule-of-law problems created by the Eleventh Amendment. 
The rule-of-law ideal insists that federal courts have the power not just to stop 
ongoing violations of federal law, but also to remedy at least the most egre­
gious past violations as well. 
Id. 
55. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), superseded by 
statute, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat. 
1845 (1986). 
56. See FED. R. CIV. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the par­
ties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court shall 
dismiss the action. "). 
57. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 215. 
58. SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 14:74 (quoting Atascadero State Hasp., 473 U.S. at 
238). 
59. See supra note 26; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 215. 
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In the context of a § 1983 action, however, a state's consent to 
suit may be irrelevant.6o In Will v. Michigan Department of State 
Police, the Supreme Court held that states are not "persons" within 
the meaning of that term as used in § 1983.61 If states are not even 
included in the meaning of the statute, then no suit can be main­
tained against a state under § 1983 even if that state expressly 
consented.62 
3. Congressional Abrogation of State Sovereign Immunity 
The third mechanism for avoidance of Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is congressional abrogation. Congress, as part of a partic­
ular piece of legislation, may make the Eleventh Amendment inap­
plicable and open the states up to suit and liability, provided it 
expressly states its intention to do so in the statute.63 Whether such 
abrogation is permissible has been a matter of some controversy 
and how one answers the question is largely a function of the view 
one takes of the scope of the Amendment.64 
If the Amendment is seen as a limitation solely on the federal 
judicial power, then it has no effect on Congress and that body may 
remove state sovereign immunity for the purposes of a particular 
statute.65 If, on the other hand, the Amendment is seen as a bar to 
federal subject matter jurisdiction, then under principles that have 
been settled for over two hundred years, Congress may not expand 
the jurisdiction of the federal courts beyond the boundaries of the 
Constitution.66 It would therefore be outside of the authority of 
Congress to pass a law purporting to abrogate the Eleventh 
60. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 85 (1989) (Brennan, J., dis­
senting); SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 14:74. 
61. Will, 491 U.S. at 64 (majority opinion). 
62. See SMOLLA, supra note 50, § 14:74. "[T]he core holding of Will is to construe 
the word 'person' under § 1983 to exclude states, and thus 'neither a federal court or a 
state court may entertain a § 1983 action against such a defendant.'" Id. (quoting Howl­
ett ex rei. Howlett v. Rose, 496 U.S. 356, 376 (1990)). 
63. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89,99 (1984); Fitzpat­
rick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
64. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 220. 
65. See Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1, 18 (1989); CHEMERINSKY, 
supra note 27, at 220 (citing John E. Nowak, The Scope of Congressional Power to 
Create Causes ofAction Against State Governments and the History of the Eleventh and 
Fourteenth Amendments, 75 COLUM. L. REV. 1413 (1975); Laurence H. Tribe, Intergov­
ernmental Immunities in Litigation, Taxation, and Regulation: Separation of Powers Is­
sues in Controversies About Federalism, 89 HARv. L. REV. 682 (1976)). 
66. See Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803) (holding § 13 of the 
Judiciary Act of 1789 to be an unconstitutional expansion of the jurisdiction of the 
Supreme Court); CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 221. 
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Amendment immunity of the states. As it stands today, Congress 
may abrogate the states' Eleventh Amendment immunity by stat­
ute, but only when legislating under certain of its enumerated 
powers.67 
Congress may only legislate pursuant to the powers conferred 
on it by the Constitution.68 Those powers are enumerated in Arti­
cle I, § 8 of the Constitution and are further granted by several 
Amendments.69 Section 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment is typical: 
"The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legisla­
tion, the provisions of this article."70 In 1976, the Court held that 
the Civil Rights Act of 196471 permissibly authorized private suits 
for damages directly against a state since the Act was passed to 
enforce the provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment.72 Holding 
that the sovereignty of the states and the principles embodied in the 
Eleventh Amendment were "necessarily limited" by the enforce­
ment clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, the Court stated, 
When Congress acts pursuant to § 5, not only is it exercising leg­
islative authority that is plenary within the terms of the constitu­
tional grant, it is exercising that authority under one section of a 
constitutional Amendment whose other sections by their own 
terms embody limitations on state authority. We think that Con­
gress may, in determining what is "appropriate legislation" for 
67. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 27, at 221. 
68. Marbury, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) at 176-77; Martin v. Hunter's Lessee, 14 U.S. (1 
Wheat.) 304, 326 (1816). 
69. The Thirteenth, Fourteenth, Fifteenth, Nineteenth, Twenty-third, Twenty­
fourth, and Twenty-sixth Amendments contain enforcement clauses. The Eighteenth 
Amendment did as well, however the Amendment was repealed by the Twenty-first 
Amendment. As for the Article I powers, the language of each granting clause makes 
clear that Congress may make such laws as are necessary to exercise the power granted. 
The Article then gives Congress the general grant of power "[t]o make all Laws which 
shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 18. 
70. U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 5. The Fourteenth Amendment provides, in rele­
vant part, 
"All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the juris­
diction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they 
reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privi­
leges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor shall any State deprive 
any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law; nor deny to 
any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." 
U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1. 
71. Civil Rights Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-352, 78 Stat. 241 (codified at 42 
U.S.c. §§ 2000a-2000h-6 (2000». 
72. See generally Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445 (1976). 
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the purpose of enforcing the provisions of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, provide for private suits against States or state offi­
cials which are constitutionally impermissible in other contexts.?3 
In 1989, the Court extended this holding to include Acts of 
Congress passed under the Interstate Commerce Clause.74 In find­
ing that Congress may abrogate state immunity from suit when it is 
legislating under the Commerce Clause, Justice Brennan relied on 
Court precedent75 as well as the nature of the Commerce Power.76 
The Court, however, overruled this opinion in 1996.77 Semi­
nole Tribe ofFlorida v. Florida involved another congressional act7s 
that was clearly intended to abrogate state sovereign immunity and 
was passed pursuant to the Commerce Power-in this case, Con­
gress's authority to "regulate commerce . . . with the Indian 
73. /d. at 456. 
74. Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989); see U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, 
cl. 3 ("The Congress shall have Power .... [t]o regulate commerce ... among the 
several States."). Union Gas considered whether the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA) as amended by the 
Superfund Amendments and Reauthorization Act of 1986 (SARA) expressed a Con­
gressional intent to authorize suits against the states in federal court, and if so, whether 
that authorization was within the commerce power. The Court answered "yes" to the 
first question and "yes" to the second, although somewhat tentatively. Justice Brennan 
wrote the opinion of the Court with respect to the question of congressional intent. 
This part of the opinion was joined by Justices Marshall, B1ackmun, Stevens, and Scalia. 
The part of Justice Brennan's opinion addressing the question of abrogation of the 
Eleventh Amendment under the Commerce Clause was joined only by Justices Mar­
shall, Blackmun, and Stevens. Justice White wrote a separate opinion in which he 
agreed that Congress has the authority to abrogate state immunity under Article I, but 
disagreed with the reasoning of the plurality. 
75. Union Gas, 491 U.S. at 14-19 (Part III.A of the opinion). Acknowledging that 
the Court had never "squarely resolved" the issue of the relation between the Com­
merce Power and the Eleventh Amendment, Justice Brennan nevertheless concluded 
that the Court's prior cases unmistakably sent the message that "the power to regulate 
commerce includes the power to override States' immunity from suit, but [the Court] 
will not conclude that Congress has overridden this immunity unless it does so clearly." 
Id. at 14-15. 
76. Id. at 19-23 (Part I1I.B of the opinion). For Justice Brennan, the very nature 
of the power conferred by the Commerce Clause included the power to abrogate state 
immunity. He reasoned that, just as the states assented to national control over the 
regulation of commerce, so too they agreed to relinquish their immunity in the event 
that Congress found it necessary, in exercising the power granted by the Commerce 
Clause, to hold the states liable for damages. The states, therefore, are "not 'uncon­
senting'; they gave their consent all at once, by ratifying the Constitution, rather than 
on a case-by-case basis." Id. at 19-20. 
77. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
78. Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, Pub. L. No. 100-497, 102 Stat. 2467 (codified 
at 25 U.S.c. §§ 2701-2721 (2000)). 
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tribes. "79 
In overruling Union Gas, the Court held that Article I of the 
Constitution may not be used to circumvent the limitations placed 
on judicial power by the Eleventh Amendment.80 It is worth quot­
ing the Court's rationale: 
In overruling Union Gas today, we reconfirm that the back­
ground principle of state sovereign immunity embodied in the 
Eleventh Amendment is not so ephemeral as to dissipate when 
the subject of the suit is an area ... that is under the exclusive 
control of the Federal Government. Even when the Constitution 
vests in Congress complete lawmaking authority over a particular 
area, the Eleventh Amendment prevents congressional authori­
zation of suits by private parties against unconsenting States.81 
Under the law as it stands today, the Eleventh Amendment 
presents a jurisdictional bar to all suits commenced against a state 
by a private citizen.82 It does not, however, bar suits against a state 
by another state; nor does it bar suits commenced against a state by 
the United States.83 There are three mechanisms of ameliorating 
the impact of the Eleventh Amendment. First, an individual may 
seek prospective injunctive relief from an ongoing violation of fed­
eral law by bringing an Ex parte Young action against a state of­
ficer.84 Second, a state may consent to suit and thereby waive the 
immunity conferred by the Eleventh Amendment.85 Finally, Con­
gress may abrogate state immunity by clear statutory intent; how­
ever, after Seminole Tribe, it appears that this is only available 
79. u.s. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. In the six years since Union Gas, the makeup of 
the Court had changed. Three of the four members of the Union Gas plurality (Justices 
Brennan, Marshall, and Blackmun) had left the Court. Gone also was Justice White, 
who had agreed that Congress could abrogate under the Commerce Clause. Justice 
Clarence Thomas replaced Justice Marshall and aligned himself with the Union Gas 
dissenters (Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justices O'Connor, Scalia, and Kennedy). 
While concluding that Congress clearly intended to make the states subject to suit 
under the statute, and finding that "no principled distinction" could be drawn between 
the Interstate and Indian Commerce Clauses, Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 63, the Court 
held that"Union Gas has proved to be a solitary departure from established law" and 
that "both the result in Union Gas and the plurality's rationale depart from our estab­
lished understanding of the Eleventh Amendment and undermine the accepted func­
tion of Article 111." Id. at 66. 
80. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72-73. 
81. Id. at 72. 
82. See supra notes 30-37 and accompanying text. 
83. Maryland v. Louisiana, 451 U.S. 725,745 n.21 (1981); United States v. Missis­
sippi, 380 U.S. 128, 140-41 (1965). 
84. See supra notes 41-53 and accompanying text. 
85. See supra notes 54-61 and accompanying text. 
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when Congress is legislating pursuant to the enforcement power 
conferred by § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.86 
Plaintiffs in federal court are obliged to state the grounds on 
which the jurisdiction of the court rests in their initial pleading.87 
They are further obliged to state the capacity of the parties to sue 
or be sued, if such a statement is necessary to show jurisdiction.88 
The Eleventh Amendment is one of the provisions by which the 
federal courts are limited in the types of suits they can entertain. 
The disagreement between the bright-line and course-of-proceed­
ings rationales centers on the nature of the limitation imposed by 
the Amendment and the extent of responsibility that can, in fair­
ness, be placed on the § 1983 plaintiff to clearly identify in her com­
plaint the capacity in which she is suing the defendant.89 
II. SECTION 1983 
Section 1983 of Title 42 of the United States Code is one ofthe 
most important, and most often used, federal laws on the books.90 
The statute provides a private cause of action against any person 
who, while acting under the color of state law, infringes on an­
other's rights under the Constitution or federal law.91 Conse­
quently, it is most often state or local government officials who are 
sued under § 1983. Thus, the Eleventh Amendment can playa sig­
nificant role in the direction of § 1983 litigation and the body of 
case law in this area. The discussion below sets out a brief history 
of § 1983 and traces some of the milestone § 1983 decisions of the 
Supreme Court. 
86. See supra notes 62-80 and accompanying text. 
87. FED. R. CIV. P. 8(a)(1). 
88. FED. R. CIV. P. 9(a). 
89. See infra Part IV. 
90. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 451 (quoting MARTIN A. SCHWARTZ & JOHN 
E. KIRKLIN, SECTION 1983 LITIGATION: CLAIMS, DEFENSES, AND FEES 2 (3d ed. 1997». 
Between April 1, 2004 and March 31, 2005, 35,364 private civil rights actions were filed 
in federal district courts. A further 22,745 actions were brought by prisoners over 
prison conditions or civil rights violations. FEDERAL JUDICIAL CASELOAD STATISTIC, 
U.S. DISTRICT COURTS-CIVIL CASES COMMENCED, BY NATURE OF SUIT AND DIS­
TRICT, DURING THE 12 MONTH PERIOD ENDING MARCH 31, 2005 (2005), http://www.us 
courts.gov/caseload2005/tables/C03mar05.pdf. While an exact breakdown of the partic­
ular statutes under which each case was filed is unavailable, § 1983 provides for a gen­
eral remedy for violations of any individual right secured by the Constitution or federal 
law. See supra note 7. Thus, § 1983 claims are often included in actions brought pursu­
ant to federal statutes regarding voting, employment, accommodations, welfare, or 
other rights. 
91. See text of statute, supra note 7. 
338 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:323 
A. Early History, Monroe, and Monell 
Section 1983 was originally enacted as part of the Civil Rights 
Act of April 20, 1871, also known as the Ku Klux Klan Act.92 On 
March 23 of that year, President Ulysses S. Grant sent a message to 
Congress stating, 
A condition of affairs now exists in some States of the Union 
rendering life and property insecure and the carrying of the mails 
and the collection of the revenue dangerous. The proof that such 
a condition of affairs exists in some localities is now before the 
Senate. That the power to correct these evils is beyond the con­
trol of the State authorities I do not doubt; that the power of the 
Executive of the United States, acting within the limits of existing 
laws, is sufficient for present emergencies is not clear. Therefore, 
I urgently recommend such legislation as in the judgment of Con­
gress shall effectually secure life, liberty, and property, and the 
enforcement of law in all parts of the United States.93 
Five days later, H.R. 320 was introduced on the House floor by 
Representative Shellabarger. 94 
The Supreme Court has summarized the congressional debate 
on H.R. 320 on a number of occasions.95 In referring to the portion 
of the Act that became § 1983, the Court has stated that three goals 
are apparent.96 First, the Act sought to override certain state 
laws.97 Second, the Act sought to give a federal remedy in cases 
where state law was inadequate.98 Finally, the Act sought to pro­
vide a federal remedy in cases where, although there was a state 
92. Ch. XXII, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). Section 1 of the Act, which became § 1983, 
provided in relevant part: 
That any person who, under color of any law, statute, ordinance, regulation, 
custom, or usage of any State, shall subject, or cause to be subjected, any per­
son within the jurisdiction of the United States to the deprivation of any rights, 
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution of the United States, 
shall, any such law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage of the 
State to the contrary notwithstanding, be liable to the party injured in any 
action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress. 
93. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 172-73 (1961) (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 42d 
Cong., 1st Sess., 244 (1871». 
94. Monell V. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665 
(1978). The bill as it was introduced, and as it was adopted into law, was entitled, "An 
Act to enforce the Provisions of the Fourteenth Amendment to the Constitution of the 
United States, and for other Purposes." 17 Stat. at 13. 
95. See, e.g., Monroe, 365 U.S. at 172-90; Monell, 436 U.S. at 665-95. 
96. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 173. 
97. Id. 
98. Id. 
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remedy that was theoretically applicable and adequate, the state 
remedy was unavailable in practice.99 
Section 1 of the Act, which was eventually codified as § 1983, 
created a federal cause of action for the violation of constitutional 
rights committed "under color of" state law.1Oo Though the Senate 
Report focused heavily on violations committed by the Klan and its 
members, § 1 was not directed at them, but rather at the state offi­
cials who allowed such violations to go without redress.1OI The sub­
sequent sections of H.R. 320 and of the Act as adopted dealt more 
specifically with activities and conspiracies such as those engaged in 
by the Klan.102 Section 1 made it through both the House and Sen­
ate without amendment and was enacted as introduced.Io3 The 
Civil Rights Act of 1871 passed the Senate by a vote of 36 to 13 on 
April 19.104 The Act was passed by the House the next day, less 
99. Id. at 174. The situation in the South, at least in the minds of the supporters 
of the bilI, was grave enough to warrant federal intervention. This much is clear from 
statements on the House and Senate floors that presented a dramatic picture of torture 
and murder committed against black citizens as well as white Unionists and agents of 
the federal government while the state authorities did little to bring the offenders to 
justice. Representative Lowe of Kansas spoke of "murder ... stalking abroad in dis­
guise" and stated that "while whippings and lynchings and banishment have been vis­
ited upon unoffending American citizens, the local administrations have been found 
inadequate or unwilling to apply the proper corrective." Id. at 175 (quoting CONGo 
GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 374 (1871». Representative Beatty of Ohio pointed to 
"voluminous and unquestionable" proof that states were denying their citizens the 
equal protection of the law: "Men were murdered, houses were burned, women were 
outraged, men were scourged, and officers of the law shot down; and the State made no 
successful effort to bring the guilty to punishment or afford protection or redress to the 
outraged and innocent." Id. (quoting CONGo GLOBE, 42d Cong., 1st Sess. 428 (1871)). 
100. Ch. XXII, § 1, 17 Stat. 13 (1871). 
101. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 175-76. During its consideration of the proposed legisla­
tion, Congress had before it the 600 page report of the Select Committee of the Senate 
to Investigate Alleged Outrages in the Southern States, detailing the civil rights viola­
tions in the South and the lack of action on the part of state authorities in dealing with 
the perpetrators. S. REP. No. 42-1 (1871). The Committee had taken testimony from 
"representatives of all shades of political opinion," including "State and Federal judges, 
prosecuting officers, political editors, ministers of the gospel, private citizens both white 
and colored, members of what is popularly known as the Ku Klux Klan, magistrates, 
constables, members of the bar, [and] men who have been scourged and abused by 
bands of men in disguise." S. REP. No. 42-1, at 2 (1871). The conclusion drawn by 
Congress that the situation in the South required federal intervention was based on this 
report. Monroe, 365 U.S. at 174, 183; CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 454. 
102. See Ch. XXII, §§ 2-6, 17 Stat. at 13-15. 
103. Monell V. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 665 
(1978). 
104. Gene R. Nichol, Jr., Federalism, State Courts, and Section 1983, 73 VA. L. 
REV. 959, 974 n.93 (1987). 
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than a month after its introduction.lo5 
Though it seems somewhat incongruent with the apparent en­
thusiasm with which the Act was passed, for many years after its 
enactment, § 1983 seemed almost a dead letter.106 From 1871 to 
1920 a mere twenty-one cases were decided under § 1983, and none 
under the conspiracy provisionsl07 of the Act.108 As late as 1960, 
§ 1983 litigation made up a miniscule portion of the federal docket, 
with only 287 cases being commenced in or removed to federal 
court in that year.109 This trend began to change dramatically in 
1961 with the Court's decision in Monroe v. Pape.1l0 
In Monroe, the Court held that Congress intended § 1983 "to 
give a remedy to parties deprived of constitutional rights, privileges 
and immunities by an official's abuse of his position. "111 Thus, the 
"under color of law" language of the statute did not merely mean 
that liability would attach only when the wrongful acts were com­
mitted with the authority of some state statute or regulation.1l2 
Rather, the actions of an official that are outside of his authority, 
105. /d. 
106. See CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 455-56. 
107. Ch. XXII, § 2, 17 Stat. 13-14 (1871). 
108. Comment, The Civil Rights Act: Emergence of an Adequate Federal Civil 
Remedy?, 26 IND. L.J. 361, 363 (1951). The reasons for this lack of vitality lie largely in 
the shifting of the historical tides. The Act had been passed by the Reconstruction 
Congress. Reconstruction came to an end in 1877 after the Republican Party agreed to 
abandon it in exchange for Rutherford Hayes being declared President over Samuel 
Tilden. American Experience, Reconstruction: the Second Civil War, timeline, http:// 
www.pbs.orglwgbh/amexlreconstructionlstates/sUimeline2.html (last visited March 27, 
2006). With the end of Reconstruction, so too came the end of Northern interest in the 
rights of African Americans in the South. Furthermore, as it turned out, federal judges 
had no more of an interest in allowing the vindication of black rights than did state 
judges. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 455. Also, the Supreme Court at this time took 
a restrictive view of the authority of the federal government to pass civil rights legisla­
tion. See, e.g., Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896); The Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 
3 (1883); The Slaughterhouse Cases, 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36 (1873); CHEMERINSKY, supra 
note 17, at 455. 
109. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at 456 (citing THEODORE EISENBERG, CIVIL 
RIGHTS LEGISLATION: CASES AND MATERIALS 86 (2d ed. 1987». 
110. 365 U.S. 167 (1961). The case arose out of a raid on the petitioners' home by 
the Chicago Police Department. The Monroes filed suit under § 1983 alleging that their 
home was entered and searched without warrant and that Mr. Monroe was arrested and 
detained without warrant in violation of their constitutional rights. Thirteen police of­
ficers and the City of Chicago were named as defendants. Id. at 169-70. The District 
Court dismissed the complaint, agreeing with the City that it could not be held liable 
under § 1983, nor could it be held liable for "acts committed in performance of its 
governmental functions." Id. The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id. 
111. Id. at 172. 
112. See id. 
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but" 'made possible only because the wrongdoer is clothed with the 
authority of state law,''' and which violate the federal rights of an­
other, "'[are] action[s] taken under color of state law."'113 This 
holding significantly expanded the range of possible defendants 
under § 1983.114 
But where the Court gave, the Court also took away. In the 
same opinion, the Court upheld co-defendant City of Chicago's 
contention that Congress did not intend to include municipalities 
within the meaning of "persons" as used in § 1983.115 This limit 
remained in place for seventeen years until the Court decided Mo­
nell v. Department of Social Services of the City of New York,116 
which represents the second major expansion of the scope of liabil­
ity under § 1983. 
Monell provided an opportunity for the Court to revisit its 
analysis of the legislative history of § 1983. The Court began by 
recapping the Monroe Court's reasoning that the 42d Congress's 
rejection of the Sherman Amendment was conclusive evidence of 
Congressional intent to exclude municipal corporations from liabil­
ity under § 1983.117 After re-examination, however, the Monell 
113. [d. at 184 (quoting United States v. Classic, 313 U.S. 299, 326 (1941». 
114. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 
704-05 (1978) (Powell, J., concurring). 
115. The Court found compelling the fact that a proposed amendment to the Act 
of 1871 (the Sherman Amendment) that would have imposed municipal liability for 
violent acts committed within its boundaries was rejected by the House and by the 
Conference Committee and ultimately not included in the Act. Monroe, 365 at 188-90. 
The Court concluded that the response to the Sherman Amendment "was so antagonis­
tic that we cannot believe that the word "person" was used in this particular Act to 
include [municipalities]." Id. at 191. The Court found further support for its position in 
the permissive wording of the Act of February 25,1871 (the Dictionary Act, Ch. LXXI, 
§ 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871», which stated that the word "person" may be interpreted to 
include "bodies politic and corporate" but did not require such an interpretation. 
Monroe, 365 U.S. at 190-91. 
116. 436 U.S. 658 (1978). The suit was brought by a class of female employees of 
the Department of Social Services and the Board of Education of New York City. Id. at 
660. The basis of their complaint was that the Department and the Board had com­
pelled pregnant employees to take unpaid leaves of absence prior to the time such leave 
was required for medical reasons. Id. at 660-61. Though the District Court held that the 
practice was unconstitutional, the plaintiffs' claim for back pay was denied "because 
any such damages would come ultimately from the City of New York and ... circum­
vent the immunity conferred on municipalities by Monroe v. Pape." [d. at 662. The 
Court of Appeals affirmed and held that, despite being sued solely in their official ca­
pacities, the individual defendants were "persons" within the meaning of § 1983. How­
ever, a damages action against them could not go forward since any damages assessed 
against them would "have to be paid by a city that was held not to be amenable to such 
action in Monroe v. Pape." Id. 
117. Id. at 664. 
342 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:323 
Court found that the "liability imposed by [§ 1983] was something 
very different from that imposed by the amendment. "118 On the 
basis of its review of the legislative history, the Monell Court con­
cluded that the Monroe Court had "incorrectly equated" the objec­
tions to the Sherman Amendment with objections to municipal 
liability under § 1983.119 Accordingly, the Court held that Congress 
did not intend to exclude municipalities from the scope of § 1983, 
and overruled Monroe "insofar as it [held] that local governments 
are wholly immune from suit under § 1983."120 
Having concluded that municipalities were not excluded from 
the scope of § 1983, the question still remained as to whether they 
were actually included; that is, whether Congress intended that mu­
nicipal corporations be included in the statutory language "any per­
son."121 Again, the Court looked to the debates surrounding the 
passage of the 1871 Act and concluded that Congress meant to pro­
vide a broad remedy for civil rights violations in enacting § 1983.122 
Since municipal corporations could, just as well as natural persons, 
violate these rights through their policies and official acts, and since 
Congress intended the section to be broadly interpreted, "there is 
no reason to suppose that municipal corporations would have been 
excluded from the sweep of [§ 1983)."123 
118. Id. at 682. 
119. Id. at 665. The Court sets out three distinctions between the Sherman 
Amendment and § 1983 in support of its conclusion. First, the Sherman Amendment 
was not an amendment to the section that became § 1983; rather it was to be included 
as a separate section of the Act. Id. at 666. Second, the main objection to the Sherman 
Amendment was that it sought to unconstitutionally impose a requirement on munici­
palities to keep the peace. Id. at 674. There was no such objection to § 1983. The Court 
here points to a distinction that was recognized in the debates on the Act between 
imposing a federal obligation to keep the peace (as would be required by the amend­
ment) and imposing civil liability for damages on a municipal corporation that was obli­
gated under state law to keep the peace but had failed to do so and thus violated the 
Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 679. Finally, many of those who voted against the 
amendment voted in favor of the section of the Act that became § 1983, thus confirming 
that Congress recognized the difference between the obligation sought to be imposed 
by the amendment and the liability sought to be imposed by § 1983. Id. at 682. 
120. Id. at 663. 
121. Id. at 683. 
122. Id. at 685. Noting that the remedy provided by § 1983 applied to whites as 
well as blacks, the Court pointed to the statement of Congressman Shellabarger, the 
sponsor of the bill, who identified § 1983 as remedial, and quoted Justice Story: "Where 
a power is remedial in its nature there is much reason to contend that it ought to be 
construed liberally ...." Id. at 684. 
123. Id. at 686. As further support for this view the Court pointed, in the first 
place, to Congressman Bingham's belief that uncompensated takings by municipalities, 
such as the one at issue in Barron v. Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (holding that 
the provisions of the Fifth Amendment were enforceable only against the Federal Gov­
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B. Quern v. Jordan 
With Quem v. Jordan, the Court began to delineate the bound­
aries of state liability and immunity under § 1983.124 The action 
arose out of the wrongful denial of welfare benefits to a class of 
plaintiffs.125 At its core, the decision reaffirmed the Court's earlier 
holding in Edelman v. Jordan 126 that retrospective monetary relief 
against states is barred by the Eleventh Amendment, while pro­
spective injunctive relief against state officers, even if such relief 
will deplete funds from the state treasury, is allowed.127 Quem 
went further, however, and considered whether the Monell holding 
could be extended to cover state as well as municipal governments. 
Addressing the respondent's contention that the Edelman holding 
had been "eviscerated" by the Court's holding in Monell, Justice 
Rehnquist, writing for the Court, stated, "This court's holding in 
Monell was 'limited to local government units which are not consid­
ered part of the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes ....' "128 
While admitting that both the supporters and opponents of the 
1871 Act believed that it drastically changed the relationship be­
tween the federal government and the governments of the states, 
the Court found that 
neither logic, the circumstances surrounding the adoption of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, nor the legislative history of the 1871 
Act compels, or even warrants, a leap from this proposition to 
the conclusion that Congress intended by the general language of 
the Act to overturn the constitutionally guaranteed immunity of 
ernment), would be actionable under § 1983. Monell, 436 U.S. at 687. Further, the 
Court noted that, by 1871, corporations were treated as persons for almost every pur­
pose under law. Id. Finally, the Court looked to the Dictionary Act, and its definition 
of "persons" as inclusive of "bodies politic and corporate [in all acts hereinafter 
passed]." Id. at 688; Ch. LXXI, § 2, 16 Stat. 431 (1871). Believing the Monroe Court's 
focus on the word "may" was misplaced, the Court stated that the purpose of the Dic­
tionary Act was to provide rules of construction for congressional Acts. Monell, 436 
U.S. at 690 n.53. In that context, if the definitions provided were merely permissible, 
rather than mandatory, "there would be no rules at all." Id. Under Monell, "[l]ocal 
governing bodies ... can be sued directly under § 1983 for monetary, declaratory, or 
injunctive relief where ... the action that is alleged to be unconstitutional implements 
or executes a policy statement, ordinance, regulation, or decision officially adopted and 
promulgated by that body's officers." Id. at 690. The suability of local governments 
under § 1983 is limited, however, to circumstances where action taken in pursuance of 
an official policy causes the constitutional tort. Id. at 691. 
124. Quern v. Jordan, 440 U.S. 332 (1979). 
125. Id. at 333. 
126. 415 U.S. 651 (1974). 
127. Quem, 440 U.S. at 337. 
128. Id. at 338. 
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the several States.129 
The Court found no evidence that Congress "considered and 
firmly decided to abrogate" the states' immunity under the Elev­
enth Amendment and concluded that Congress did not intend to do 
so by enacting § 1983.130 
C. Will v. Michigan Department of State Police 
The question before the Court in Will was whether a state, or 
state official acting in his official capacity, is considered a "person" 
within the meaning of § 1983.131 The case came to the U.S. Su­
preme Court from the Supreme Court of Michigan, which had held 
in the negative as to both questions.132 The Court took the case to 
resolve a conflict that had arisen since its holding in Monell. 133 
Over a decade earlier, in Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, the Court had 
used Monroe's holding that a city is not a "person" under § 1983 to 
reason that the statute "could not have been intended to include 
States as parties defendan1."134 After Monell's partial overruling of 
Monroe, it was thought by some courts that the rationale for ex­
cluding states from the sweep of "persons" under § 1983 had also 
been undercut.135 As the Will case came from a state court system, 
the Eleventh Amendment did not apply and the question of a 
state's "personhood" was squarely at issue.136 
While not an Eleventh Amendment case, the Amendment 
played a strong role in the Court's reasoning that the phrase "any 
person" in § 1983 was not intended to include states. First, the 
Court applied the rule that if Congress intends to "alter the usual 
Constitutional balance" of power between the state and federal 
governments, that intent must be "unmistakably clear" in the lan­
guage of the statute.137 Finding the language of § 1983 to fall "far 
short" of that mark, the Court then stated that although Congress 
129. Id. at 342. 
130. Id. at 345. 
131. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58,60 (1989). 
132. Smith v. Mich. Dep't of Public Health, 410 N.W.2d 749, 750 (Mich. 1987). 
133. Will, 491 U.S. at 61-62. 
134. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 452 (1976). 
135. Will, 491 U.S. at 61-62. 
136. Id. at 63-64. This would no longer be entirely true in light of the Court's 
holding in 1999 that a state enjoys immunity from suit in its own courts, as well as in 
federal courts. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,754 (1999). Under Alden, while the text 
of the Amendment applies only to the federal judiciary, the structural principle of sov­
ereign immunity retains equal significance in both the federal and state systems. 
137. Will, 491 U.S. at 65. 
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intended to provide a federal forum for the litigation of civil rights 
claims, it did not intend to provide such a forum when the claim was 
asserted against a state.138 The Eleventh Amendment still bars 
such suits unless the state has consented or Congress has abrogated 
the state's immunityP9 
Having already concluded in Quem that Congress did not in­
tend § 1983 to abrogate state immunity, and so did not intend to 
provide a vehicle for states to be sued in federal court, the Court 
found the suggestion that Congress nevertheless intended to create 
a vehicle for states to be sued in state court to be unacceptable.140 
Congress was aware of, and intended to incorporate, common law 
immunities and defenses in enacting § 1983.141 According to the 
Court, the principle that a state cannot be sued in its own courts 
without its consent was one of the most fundamental of these com­
mon law immunities.142 
Under Will, § 1983 is a means of redress for the "official viola­
tion of federally protected rights."143 However, this "does no more 
than confirm that the section is directed against state action-ac­
tion 'under color of' state law."l44 To make the leap to the proposi­
tion that Congress intended to make the states themselves liable for 
such actions-that it intended to make them "persons" under 
§ 1983-is something the Court was unwilling to do.145 
From its conclusion that states are not "persons" for the pur­
pose of § 1983, the Court quickly rejected the proposition that state 
officials are § 1983 "persons" when acting in their official capac­
ity.146 A suit against an official in his official capacity is not a suit 
against the office-holder but a suit against the office.147 It is the 
same as suing the state itself.148 Thus, not only are suits against 
states under § 1983 barred in federal court, but they are barred in 
state court as well. Suits against state officials that have the charac­
138. Id. at 65-66. 
139. Id. at 66. For discussion of state consent and congressional abrogation, see 
supra Parts I.B.2 and I.B.3. 
140. Id. at 67. 
141. Id. 
142. Id. 
143. Id. at 68. 
144. Id. 
145. Id. 
146. /d. at 70-71. 
147. Id. at 71 (citing Brandon v. Holt, 469 U.S. 464, 471 (1985)). 
148. Id. (citing Kentucky v. Graham, 473 U.S. 159,165-66 (1985)). 
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ter of suits against the office, rather than the individual, are also 
barred. 
D. Hafer v. Melo 
In 1991, the Supreme Court granted certiorari in Hafer v. 
Melo 149 to resolve what it saw as a misinterpretation of the Will 
holding.150 Justice O'Connor's opinion for a unanimous Court be­
gan with the following statement: 
In [Will], we held that state officials 'acting in their official capac­
ities' are outside the class of 'persons' subject to liability under 
[§ 1983]. Petitioner takes this language to mean that § 1983 does 
not authorize suits against state officers for damages arising from 
official acts. We reject this reading of Will and hold that state 
officials sued in their individual capacities are 'persons' for pur­
poses of § 1983.151 
Hafer argued that liability under § 1983 depends on the capac­
ity in which the official was acting at the time the plaintiff was in­
jured.152 According to Hafer, if an official is sued over conduct 
occurring in the course of the exercise of her duties and within her 
authority, the action is an official-capacity suit. Therefore, it cannot 
proceed under § 1983 because, under Will, state officials acting in 
their official capacities are not "persons" for the purpose of the 
statute.153 
The Court disagreed, holding that "the phrase 'acting in their 
official capacities' is best understood as a reference to the capacity 
in which the officer is sued, not the capacity in which the officer 
inflicts the alleged injury."154 The Court then expressly foreclosed 
any interpretation that could give rise to arguments like Hafer's.155 
State officers are not "persons" when sued in their official capaci­
ties because, for purposes of the suit, they stand in the place of the 
government for which they work.156 As Will pointed out, to hold 
otherwise would allow suits to proceed against the state simply by a 
renaming of the parties.157 
149. 502 U.S. 21 (1991). 
150. Id. at 22-23. 
151. Id. 
152. Id. at 26. 
153. Id. 
154. Id. 
155. Id. at 27. 
156. Id. 
157. Id. (quoting Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 n.1O (1989». 
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Hafer's argument was built on flawed logic. As is familiar by 
now, § 1983 was enacted to provide a remedy against the depriva­
tion of federal rights by those acting with the apparent authority of 
the state-i.e., under color of state law.15s To allow Hafer's argu­
ment to succeed would be to allow her to be immunized by the 
same authority that gave her the opportunity to commit the viola­
tion of rights in the first place.159 
Hafer also advanced the argument that the suit should be 
barred on Eleventh Amendment grounds.160 She contended that 
allowing personal capacity suits against state officers would infringe 
on state sovereignty by making state government less effective.161 
The Court quickly dispensed with this argument as well, declaring 
that it has been settled law since the time of Ex parte Young that 
the Eleventh Amendment does not provide cover to a state official 
sued as an individua1.162 Thus, the Court held (1) that state officials 
sued in their individual capacities are "persons" within the meaning 
of § 1983, (2) that the Eleventh Amendment presents no barrier to 
such suits, and (3) that the official nature of a state official's acts 
does not confer an absolute immunity from liability.163 
One issue the Hafer Court left unresolved was how the nature 
of the suit, whether personal or official capacity, is to be deter­
mined in cases where it is not made clear in the pleadings. Noting 
that the U.S. courts of appeals were divided on the question, the 
Court suggested that it would be preferable to be clear from the 
starU64 However, as the matter was not properly before it, the 
Court declined to resolve the issue.165 
III. THE DISAGREEMENT IN THE CiRCUITS 
A. The Minority Position 
The United States Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit has 
long required § 1983 plaintiffs to make an explicit statement of ca­
pacity in their complaints.166 Absent an express statement that the 
158. Id. 
159. Id. at 28. 
160. Id. at 29. 
161. Id. 
162. Id. at 30. 
163. Id. at 31. 
164. Id. at 24 n.*. 
165. Id. 
166. See, e.g., Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 939 (8th Cir. 2005); Johnson v. 
Outboard Marine Corp., 172 F.3d 531 (8th Cir. 1999); Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 
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defendant is being sued individually, rather than officially, the court 
has applied the conclusive presumption that the suit was brought 
against the defendant in his or her official capacity only.167 As 
such, if the plaintiff sought a remedy other than the sort of injunc­
tive relief allowed under Ex parte Young, the suit was deemed to be 
barred by the Eleventh Amendment.168 The court went so far as to 
prescribe specific language that plaintiffs were to include in order to 
ensure clarity.169 
For a while the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit agreed 
with the Eighth Circuit approach and adopted it for itselfpO 
Where the Sixth Circuit stands today is questionable. In any event, 
two concerns were at the heart of the position adopted by these 
courts. First, they wanted to ensure that a government officer de­
fendant had adequate notice of personal liability to the plaintiff.171 
Second, in the courts' view, only a clear statement of capacity 
would negate the Eleventh Amendment problem that would other­
wise be raised by the suit. l72 
As to the first concern, under the bright-line view, government 
officials should be made aware of the possible consequences of the 
suit against them at the outset of the litigation. We want qualified 
individuals to go into government service, and this goal would be 
750 (8th Cir. 1997); Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coli., 72 F.3d. 615 (8th Cir. 1995); Nix v. 
Norman, 879 F.2d 429 (8th Cir. 1989). 
167. Egerdahl, 72 F.3d at 619 ("If a plaintiff's complaint is silent about the capac­
ity in which she is suing the defendant, we interpret the complaint as including only 
official-capacity claims. "). 
168. Nix, 879 F.2d at 432 (citing Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58 
(1989» ("[U]nder the formal terms of the Eleventh Amendment, [a plaintiff] may not 
bring an action solely against either the state or one of its agencies .... A state agent, 
however, may be sued in his official capacity if the plaintiff merely seeks injunctive or 
prospective relief for a legally cognizable claim. "). 
169. Id. at 431 (requiring the statement "Plaintiff sues each and all defendants in 
both their individual and official capacities"). 
170. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 592 (6th Cir. 1989) ("We adopt the Eighth 
Circuit's interpretation of Will, which requires that plaintiffs seeking damages under 
§ 1983 set forth clearly in their pleading that they are suing the state defendants in their 
individual capacity for damages, not simply in their capacity as state officials. "). 
171. Nix, 879 F.2d at 431 (requiring specific language that "guarantees that the 
defendant receives prompt notice"); Wells, 891 F.2d at 593 (stating that the complaint in 
this case insufficiently "alert[ed the defendant] officials that they may be personally 
accountable for any damages liability"). 
172. Nix, 879 F.2d at 430 (citing Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir. 
1984» ("The Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in 
civil rights cases against states and their employees."); Wells, 891 F.2d at 593 ("[E]ven 
liberalized pleading ... cannot confer jurisdiction on this Court to entertain suits 
against states and state officials when the Eleventh Amendment bars us from doing 
so."). 
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undermined if public servants could be surprised by a personal 
judgment against them, the possibility of which they may not have 
been aware at the outset of the litigationP3 Further, the public 
servant defendant has certain choices to make regarding defense 
strategy and the retaining of counsel that cannot be effectively 
made unless the defendant knows in what capacity he or she is be­
ing sued.174 Additionally, without notice of the nature of the suit, 
the "government defendant may ... fail to plead the affirmative 
defense of qualified immunity and thereby waive [it]."175 This con­
cern with providing adequate notice to the government defendant is 
relevant both when the defendant is an employee of a local govern­
ment and an employee of a state government. 
The second concern of the bright-line position-the jurisdic­
tional restriction imposed by the Eleventh Amendment-is only 
present when the defendant is an employee of a state government. 
Under this view, the Eleventh Amendment, combined with the 
pleading requirements of the Federal Rules, requires that capacity 
be specifically pled in the compiaintP6 This jurisdictional argu­
ment only applies when defendants are state employees because the 
Eleventh Amendment is not implicated when an action is brought 
against a local government or its employees.177 
As articulated by the Eighth Circuit in Nix v. Norman, "[t]he 
173. See Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 792 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting) (pointing to the "longstanding public policy of encourag­
ing public service by protecting government officials from frivolous but nonetheless 
debilitating litigation"). 
174. See id. at 79l. 

Without such timely notice defendants might rely on their governmental em­

ployer, fail to answer, and be subject to default judgment in their personal 

capacities. Further, without early notice government defendants cannot prop­
erly decide whether to retain independent counselor to participate in collec­
tive defense strategies or settlement negotiations. Nor would the individual 
defendants be able to assess how best to engage in discovery. Under the 
course of proceedings analysis, individual capacity defendants are deprived of 
the ability to make a multitude of decisions regarding their own defense. 
Id. 
175. Id. at 791-92. "By waiving the defense, the defendant may lose the protec­
tions of the doctrine, which provides an immunity not only from liability, but from suit." 
Id. (citing Mitchell v. Forsyth, 472 U.S. 511 (1985)). 
176. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 431 (8th Cir. 1989); Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 
591, 593 (6th Cir. 1989); Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 777 (6th Cir. 2001) 
(Suhrheinrich, J. dissenting). 
177. See Monell v. Dep't of Soc. Servs. of the City of New York, 436 U.S. 658, 690 
n.54 (1978) (noting that there is "no constitutional impediment to municipal liability" 
under § 1983 because, inter alia, "local government units ... are not considered part of 
the State for Eleventh Amendment purposes"). 
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Eleventh Amendment presents a jurisdictional limit on federal 
courts in civil rights cases against states and their employees. That 
being the case, Rule 9(a) appears to require [the plaintiff] to make a 
capacity stipulation in the complaint."178 Though the court did not 
go into much detail regarding its reasoning, it appears that the 
court's conclusion was the result of a straight application of the text 
of the Amendment, as well as the holdings of Hans and Will. 
First, the Amendment provides that "[t]he judicial power shall 
not be construed to extend" to suits brought against a state by citi­
zens of another stateP9 Second, the holding in Hans further re­
moved from the judicial power suits brought against a state by one 
of its own citizens.18o Finally, the holding in Will established that an 
official-capacity suit for damages against a state official is no differ­
ent than a suit against the state for which that official works; as 
such, a state official acting in his official capacity is not a "person" 
within the meaning of § 1983.181 
Taken together, the only way for a § 1983 plaintiff to recover 
money damages in a suit against a state official is to sue the official 
in his individual or personal capacity, causing the judgment to run 
against the official's personal finances, rather than the state trea­
sury.182 It further seems to be the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit 
that this is the only way by which a federal court could gain the 
power to entertain the matter in the first place-if sued officially, 
(1) the state agent is not a person within the meaning of the statute 
and so cannot be sued under it, and (2) any judgment would run 
against the state itself, a circumstance not permitted by the Elev­
enth Amendment. Accordingly, the individual capacity nature of 
the suit is necessary to show the jurisdiction of the court and so 
must be specifically averred in the complaint. 
B. The Majority Position 
The Eighth Circuit does not have much company in its position 
on the necessity of specific pleading of capacity.183 In 2001, the 
178. 879 F.2d at 431 (citation omitted). "It is not necessary to aver the capacity of 
a party to sue or be sued ... except to the extent required to show the jurisdiction of the 
court." FED. R. Civ. P. 9(a). 
179. U.S. CONST. amend. XI. 
180. Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1, 15 (1890). 

18l. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989). 

182. See Nix, 879 F.2d at 433 ("Monetary damages are unrecoverable against [the 
official] in his official capacity ... as such an award would require an expenditure of 
state funds."). 
183. See Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 22 n.25 (1st Cir. 2004) (assembling opin­
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Sixth Circuit, which had previously adopted the Eighth Circuit's 
reasoning, appeared to reverse its position.184 The majority in 
Moore v. City of Harriman stated that its prior decision185 specifi­
cally endorsing that part of the Eighth Circuit's position that re­
quired an express statement was not actually to be interpreted so 
strictly.186 In an opinion written by Chief Judge Boyce F. Martin, 
Jr., and joined by six other members of the court, the Sixth Circuit 
announced that, despite its seeming adoption of the bright-line 
analysis, it found a course-of-proceedings test to be the way to 
gO.187 In fact, the court said it had always applied this test and had 
"never applied such a strict interpretation" of its Wells decision as 
to "requir[e] § 1983 plaintiffs to affirmatively plead 'individual ca­
pacity' in the complaint."188 Thus, despite a strident protest from 
the dissenting judges, it would appear that the Sixth Circuit has re­
pudiated its former position and joined those circuits that apply 
what has come to be known as the course-of-proceedings test to 
§ 1983 complaints that leave ambiguous whether the defendant is 
being sued personally or officially. 
For the course-of-proceedings courts, an examination of the 
nature of the complaint, the relief sought, and the litigation process 
is the proper method to determine what was meant by the plaintiff 
who has left capacity questionable.189 First, the majority position 
ions from the 2d, 3d, 4th, 6th, 7th, 9th, 10th, 11th, and D.C. Circuits adopting the 
course-of· proceedings approach). 
184. Moore v. City of Harriman, 272 F.3d 769, 772 (6th Cir. 2001). 
185. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591 (6th Cir. 1989). 
186. Moore, 272 F.3d at 772. 
187. Id. at 775. 
188. Id. at 772. The dissenting opinion took issue with the majority on a number 
of levels. It criticized the majority's interpretation of the Supreme Court's holding in 
Will, it refuted the majority's position on the scope of the Eleventh Amendment, and it 
argued vigorously against the majority's characterization of the court's prior holdings as 
adopting a course-of-proceedings test. To this final point, the dissenting opinion lists, 
over the span of almost eleven pages, all of the decisions of the court, both published 
and unpublished, that applied the requirement of a specific statement of capacity. Id. at 
778-89 (Suhrheinrich, J., dissenting). The dissenters determined that the "inescapable 
conclusion to be drawn from this catalog" was that the Sixth Circuit had "viewed the 
Wells rule as requiring plaintiffs to affirmatively plead personal capacity in the com­
plaint." Id. at 789. 
189. See, e.g., Powell v. Alexander, 391 F.3d 1, 22 (1st Cir. 2004). "Under the 
'course of proceedings' test, courts are not limited by the presence or absence of lan­
guage identifying capacity to suit on the face of the complaint alone. Rather courts may 
examine 'the substance of the pleadings and the course of proceedings in order to deter­
mine whether the suit is for individual or official liability.' " Id. (quoting Pride v. Does, 
997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th CiT. 1993». "Factors relevant to this analysis include 'the nature 
of the plaintiff's claims, requests for compensatory or punitive damages, and the nature 
352 WESTERN NEW ENGLAND LAW REVIEW [Vol. 28:323 
holds that much can be learned regarding the defendant's level of 
notice from an examination of the claims and defenses raised and 
the way the parties have treated the suit. The First Circuit, for ex­
ample, has found instructive whether a plaintiff seeks punitive dam­
ages, since this is a remedy that can only be assessed against an 
individua1.190 Likewise, making a qualified immunity defense is in­
dicative of the fact that the defendant had notice that the suit was 
against him or her individually, since the qualified immunity de­
fense is only available in the context of a personal capacity ac­
tion.191 Going perhaps a step further, the Court of Appeals for the 
Ninth Circuit has stated that the very fact that a § 1983 plaintiff is 
seeking damages at all is sufficient to indicate that the government 
official defendant is to be held personally liable.192 
Given the fact that the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure were 
intended to tip the balance in favor of adjudication on the merits, 
the Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit, while adopting a pre­
sumption that a § 1983 claim against a public official is an official­
capacity claim, nevertheless held that the presumption cannot be 
applied conclusively.193 Instead, the court advocated examining the 
way the "parties have treated the suit. "194 In one instance, the 
court found that the claims asserted in the pleadings, in addition to 
of any defenses raised in response to the complaint, particularly claims of qualified 
immunity.'" Id. (quoting Moore, 272 F.3d at 772 n.1). "A court may also take into 
consideration 'whether the parties are still in the early stages of litigation,' ... including 
whether amendment of the complaint may be appropriate." Id. (quoting Moore, 272 
F.3d at 772 n.1). "No single factor is dispositive in an assessment of the course of pro­
ceedings. 'Throughout, the underlying inquiry remains whether the plaintiff's intention 
to hold a defendant personally liable can be ascertained fairly.'" Id. at 22-23 (quoting 
Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 61 (4th Cir. 1995)). 
190. Id. at 23. 
191. Id. 
192. Price v. Akaka, 928 F.2d 824, 828 (9th Cir. 1990). 
193. Shockley v. Jones, 823 F.2d 1068, 1071 (7th Cir. 1987) (quoting Duckworth v. 
Franzen, 780 F.2d 645, 649 (7th Cir. 1985)) ("[T]he ... presumption 'cannot be conclu­
sive in a system such as the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure create, in which the com­
plaint does not fix the plaintiff's rights but may be amended at any time to conform to 
the evidence.' "). The Reporter of the Advisory Committee on Rules of Civil Proce­
dure was Professor Charles A. Clark, who was later the Dean of Yale University Law 
School. As the "dominant intellectual and operational force" behind the drafting of the 
Rules, he brought to the task a commitment to reform and a conviction "that procedure 
should be [something] entirely separate from substance." Jay S. Goodman, On the Fifti­
eth Anniversary of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure: What did the Drafters Intend?, 
21 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 351, 356-57 (1987). Clark's philosophy translated into two core 
beliefs that can be seen throughout the Rules: first, "that all cases should be decided on 
their merits," rather than won or lost by procedural tactics; second, that a fundamental 
goal of all "litigation should be economy of time and resources." Id. at 357. 
194. Shockley, 823 F.2d at 1071. 
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the plaintiff's motion in limine and the good faith immunity defense 
raised by the defendant, were sufficient to allow the conclusion that 
the defendants were sued in their personal capacities.195 Though 
generally unstated, the courts adopting the majority position seem 
to exercise the principle that ambiguity in the pleadings should be 
resolved in favor of the pleader in order to further the goal of meri­
torious claims being fully and fairly litigated.196 
Finally, the courts that use a course-of-proceedings analysis 
disagree with the minority position on the applicability and scope of 
the Eleventh Amendment in this situation. As characterized by the 
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Biggs v. Meadows, the 
minority view is based on the premise that "the Eleventh Amend­
ment operates as a substantive limitation on the subject-matter ju­
risdiction of the federal courts. "197 As such, the minority position 
requires an express averment of individual capacity "to demon­
strate that Eleventh Amendment immunity is not implicated and 
that jurisdiction is proper."198 However, this view, according to the 
Fourth Circuit, "neglects the considerable differences between 
Eleventh Amendment immunity and federal jurisdiction. "199 The 
court points to three of these differences to illustrate its point. 
First, the court states that Eleventh Amendment immunity is 
an issue that may be raised at the court's discretion.20o This is in 
contrast with other subject-matter jurisdiction questions which the 
court "must evaluate independent of the parties' contentions."201 
This assertion is based on a footnote in a Supreme Court decision 
stating that the Court "[has] never held that Eleventh Amendment 
immunity is jurisdictional in the sense that it must be raised and, 
decided by this Court on its own motion."202 Second, the Biggs 
court pointed to the ability of a state to waive its immunity under 
the Eleventh Amendment.203 Such a waiver would allow a claim 
195. Id. 
196. See generally Dioguardi v. Durning, 139 F.2d 774 (2d Cir. 1944) (holding a 
self-drafted complaint by a non-native English speaking plaintiff to be sufficient under 
the Federal Rules). 




201. Id.; see FED. R. Cry. P. 12(h)(3) ("Whenever it appears by suggestion of the 
parties or otherwise that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court 
shall dismiss the action. "). 
202. Biggs, 66 F.2d at 60 (quoting Patsy v. Bd. of Regents, 457 U.S. 496, 515 n.19 
(1982)). 
203. Id. 
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against a state to go forward in federal court where otherwise the 
state would be immune.204 In contrast, other limitations on the sub­
ject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts will stand regardless of 
anything the parties do because "'no action of the parties can con­
fer subject-matter jurisdiction upon a federal court."'205 Finally, ac­
cording to the Biggs court, "Congress has no power to override a 
constitutional limitation on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the 
federal courts."206 It is well settled, however, that Congress can ab­
rogate the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states, provided 
it is legislating under § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment and clearly 
states its intention to do SO.207 
Taking these distinctions into account, the court concluded that 
"Eleventh Amendment immunity is not truly a limit on the subject­
matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, but a block on the exercise 
of that jurisdiction."208 Once this distinction is appreciated, says 
the court, the reasoning of the minority position collapses and the 
reverse becomes true-not only is an averment of capacity unnec­
essary under Rule 9, but the Rule actually prohibits the imposition 
of a standard of pleading more stringent than that set out in Rule 
8.209 
As of today, the Sixth Circuit is generally cast as adhering to 
the course-of-proceedings standard, leaving the Eighth Circuit as 
the sole proponent of the bright-line approach. The Eighth Circuit's 
position does not appear to have weakened at all, however. As re­
cently as July of 2005 it reaffirmed the position it took in Nix.2IO 
204. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), superseded by 
statute, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat 
1845 (1986). 
205. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 60 (quoting Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de 
Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 702 (1982». 
206. Id. 
207. Id. In support of its assertion, the Biggs court compares Atascadero, which 
affirmed that" 'Congress may abrogate the States' constitutionally secured immunity 
from suit in federal court only by making its intention unmistakably clear,''' with Nat'l 
Mut. Ins. Co. v. Tidewater Transfer Co., which noted that "Congress cannot expand the 
jurisdiction of the federal court beyond that granted in the Constitution." Biggs, 66 F.3d 
at 60 (quoting Atascadero, 473 U.S. at 242 and citing Nat'l Mut. Ins. Co. v. TIdewater 
Transfer Co., 337 U.S. 582, 590 (1949». 
208. Biggs, 66 F.3d at 60. 
209. Id. 
210. Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936 (8th Cir. 2005). Though in this case the 
omission was not fatal, the court nevertheless stated that "[tJechnically, Larson's com­
plaint had to 'contain a clear statement of his wish to sue defendants in their individual 
capacities,'" id. at 939 (quoting Egerdahl v. Hibbing Cmty. Coli., 72 F.3d 615, 620 (8th 
Cir. 1995», and went on to reiterate that "without a clear statement that officials are 
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The Supreme Court noted the disagreement among the circuits in 
1992, but at the time declined to resolve the matter, as it was not 
properly before the Court.211 The Court suggested, echoing the 
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit, that it is preferable that a 
plaintiff be clear in the first instance, so as to avoid any ambigu­
ity.212 However, the very term "course of proceedings," as it is used 
here, comes from another Supreme Court decision wherein the 
Court indicated, in a slightly different situation, that the course of 
proceedings would be sufficient to indicate the nature of the claims 
at issue.213 As will be seen, much of this debate is characterized by 
a profusion of various and contradictory dicta statements of the Su­
preme Court. 
IV. ANALYSIS 
So where are we left? It is a basic principle that the federal 
courts are courts of limited jurisdiction.214 They cannot act beyond 
the authority granted in Article III of the Constitution and the laws 
passed in pursuance thereof. It is equally basic, however, that 
courts of all kinds-whether state or federal, general or limited in 
their jurisdiction-exist to do justice in accord with the laws and 
principles of equity. Further, the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
set up a system wherein matters are to be decided on their merits 
whenever possible. 
In the case of a § 1983 action against a local official, i.e., an 
official of a municipal or county government, the effect of the offi­
cial or personal capacity nature of the suit is more or less confined 
to the damages that may be awarded.215 However, as Robert Biggs 
found out, in the case of a § 1983 action against a state employee, 
being sued in personal capacities, complaint is interpreted as including only official­
capacity claims." Id. at 939 n.3 (citing Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 
1997». 
211. Hafer v. Melo, 502 U.S. 21, 24 n.* (1991). 
212. Id. 
213. See supra note 13 (describing origin of the term). 
214. CHEMERINSKY, supra note 17, at § 5.1; CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF 
FEDERAL COURTS § 7 (5th ed. 1994). 
215. For example, in Powell v. Alexander, the defendant challenged the district 
court's award of punitive damages on the grounds that she was sued solely in her offi­
cial capacity and even if the plaintiff intended to hold her personally liable, she was 
without notice of this intent. 391 F.3d 1, 5-6 (1st Cir. 2004). Punitive damages are un­
available in official-capacity suits against municipal officials because municipalities are 
immune from punitive damages awards. See City of Newport v. Fact Concerts, Inc., 453 
U.S. 247 (1981). For an analysis of the Fact Concerts case and an argument that munici­
pal corporations should be subject to punitive damages under § 1983, see Gloria Jean 
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the question of official or personal capacity can be determinative of 
whether the plaintiff is allowed to proceed with his action at all.216 
Everyone agrees that a § 1983 plaintiff should be clear in the 
first instance to avoid any confusion, but this begs the question. If 
plaintiffs were clear this issue would not come up. Are those who 
leave capacity ambiguous to be denied the opportunity to litigate 
their rights because of a possible Eleventh Amendment violation? 
Conversely, should a federal court be permitted to entertain a mat­
ter over which its jurisdiction is not apparent from the outset? 
The plaintiff who sees his claim dismissed under the bright-line 
analysis may seek leave to amend his complaint, but depending on 
the posture of the case, such leave may not be his as a matter of 
right and may be denied.217 Bringing the suit in state court seemed 
at one time to be a second option, but the Supreme Court recently 
held that a state's sovereign immunity is just as applicable there as 
in federal court.218 Thus, unless the state has consented to suit, it 
may not be sued in its own courts, either. Quite simply, it seems 
that from time to time, based on the rationale of the Eighth Circuit 
and a substantial minority of the Sixth Circuit, the § 1983 plaintiff 
will find himself without remedy despite the fact that he has 
brought a meritorious claim. 
Both sides to this debate cast their arguments in Eleventh 
Amendment terms. Therefore, this analysis will begin by examin­
ing the bright-line and course-of-proceedings positions from that 
perspective. It will go on to argue, however, that this characteriza­
tion as an Eleventh Amendment problem is inaccurate, and stems 
from a misapplication of Will v. Michigan Department of State Po­
lice. Specifically, in reaching and discussing the Eleventh Amend-
Rottell, Note, Paying the Price: It's Time to Hold Municipalities Liable for Punitive 
Damages Under 42 U.S.c. § 1983, 10 J.L. & POL'y 189 (2001). 
216. See supra text accompanying notes 1-10. 
217. Nix v. Norman, 879 F.2d 429, 433 n.3 (1989). 
Although Nix neglected to name Norman in his individual capacity, she may 
seek to do so on remand. Rule 15(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 
permits a party, on motion to the district court, to amend her pleadings "when 
justice so requires." It is a settled rule of practice that the trial court is vested 
with sound discretion to grant or to refuse such a request. If the district court 
subsequently allows Nix to add an individual-capacity claim against Norman, 
she may also seek to reinstate her request for compensatory and punitive 
damages. 
Id. (internal citation omitted) (emphasis added). 
218. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 754 (1999) ("In light of history, practice, pre­
cedent, and the structure of the Constitution, we hold that the States retain immunity 
from private suit in their own courts ...."). 
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ment issue, the courts of appeals, like the dissenters in Will, are 
presuming that § 1983 applies to states and their officers. The hold­
ing of Will, however, was that the reach of § 1983 simply does not 
include such parties. The issue, therefore, is not constitutional, but 
rather statutory in scope. 
A. The Disagreement in Terms of the Eleventh Amendment 
The Court of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit stated in Nix and 
reiterated in subsequent cases that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment 
presents a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in civil rights cases 
against states and their employees. "219 The Court of Appeals for 
the Sixth Circuit adopted the same view in Wells .220 In so doing, 
these courts treated the Eleventh Amendment as a restriction on 
the subject-matter jurisdiction of the court, akin to the complete 
diversity requirement.221 As such, according to these courts, the 
complaint must contain a clear statement that the defendant is sued 
in his individual capacity in order to establish that the court has 
jurisdiction over the claim. 
In contrast, the Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit as­
serted in Biggs that the Amendment "is not truly a limit on the 
subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, but a block on the 
exercise of that jurisdiction."222 The court declared that the reason­
ing of the Eighth and Sixth Circuits improperly conflated the sepa­
rate principles of immunity and jurisdiction.223 For the Fourth 
Circuit, and others adopting a course-of-proceedings approach, the 
effect of the Amendment is more akin to other forms of common 
law immunity available to public officials. The court did recognize, 
219. Nix, 879 F.2d at 431 (citing Rose v. Nebraska, 748 F.2d 1258, 1262 (8th Cir. 
1984); see Larson v. Kempker, 414 F.3d 936, 939-40 (8th Cir. 2005); Murphy v. Arkan­
sas, 127 F.3d 750, 755 (8th Cir. 1997). 
We . . . strictly enforce this pleading requirement because 'the Eleventh 
Amendment presents a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in civil rights 
cases against states and their employees.' Although other circuits have 
adopted a more lenient pleading rule, we believe our rule is more consistent 
with the Supreme Court's Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence. 
Id. (quoting Nix, 879 F.2d at 431) (internal citations omitted). 
220. Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1989). 
221. 28 U.S.c. § 1332 provides in relevant part: "The district courts shall have 
original jurisdiction of all civil actions where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum 
or value of $75,000, exclusive of interest and costs, and is between citizens of different 
States ...." 28 U.S.c.§ 1332 (2000); see also Strawbridge v. Curtis, 7 U.S. (3 Cranch) 
267 (1806). 
222. Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995). 
223. Id. at 59-60. 
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however, that the Amendment IS at least somewhat 
jurisdictional.224 
At least partially, the divide among federal courts regarding 
the proper treatment of the unclear § 1983 plaintiff is a reflection of 
a disagreement regarding the nature of the barrier imposed by the 
Eleventh Amendment itself. That is, whether it represents a limita­
tion on the subject-matter jurisdiction of the federal courts, or 
rather presents a bar to the exercise of jurisdiction that otherwise 
exists. The Fourth Circuit provided three examples of how the 
Eleventh Amendment was unlike a limitation on the federal courts' 
subject-matter jurisdiction: (1) the immunity conferred by the 
Amendment may be waived by the defendant state whereas no ac­
tion or consent of the parties can cure a jurisdictional defect;225 (2) 
the Eleventh Amendment immunity of the states can be abrogated 
by Congress, whereas Congress has no power to expand the juris­
diction of the federal courts beyond the bounds set out in Article 
III of the Constitution;226 and (3) courts have discretion to raise the 
Eleventh Amendment on their own motion, whereas other ques­
tions of subject-matter jurisdiction must be raised by a court sua 
sponte as soon as it appears there may be a defect.227 
That a state may consent to defend a suit otherwise barred by 
the Amendment is well-settled,228 as is the principle that Congress 
can abrogate the immunity of the states by express statement when 
legislating pursuant to § 5 of the Fourteenth Amendment.229 The 
veracity of the Fourth Circuit's statement regarding the permissive 
nature of a sua sponte assertion of the Amendment is less clear, 
however.23o 
In making this assertion, the Fourth Circuit relied on a foot­
note in the Supreme Court's decision in Patsy v. Board of Regents 
224. Id. at 60 (quoting in part the statement in Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 
U.S. 496, 516 n.19 (1982), that" 'the Eleventh Amendment defense ... partakes of the 




228. Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 238 (1985), superseded by 
statute, Rehabilitation Act Amendments of 1986, Pub. L. No. 99-506, § 1003, 100 Stat 
1845 (1986). 
229. Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976). 
230. See generally F. Ryan Keith, Note, Must Courts Raise the Eleventh Amend­
ment Sua Sponte?: The Jurisdictional Difficulty of State Sovereign Immunity, 56 WASH. 
& LEE L. REV. 1037 (1999) (providing a thorough analysis of whether courts must raise 
Eleventh Amendment concerns on their own motion). 
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of Florida.231 There the Court stated that "because of the impor­
tance of state law in analyzing Eleventh Amendment questions and 
because the state may, under certain circumstances, waive this de­
fense, we have never held that it is jurisdictional in the sense that it 
must be raised and decided by this Court on its own motion."232 
The Fourth Circuit does not mention, however, a case decided 
by the Supreme Court just two years later that contradicts the Patsy 
footnote. In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, the 
Court stated that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment is an explicit limita­
tion of the judicial power of the United States,"233 and that a court 
must look at each claim before it in order to determine whether the 
Amendment bars that claim.234 The quoted language clearly places 
the Eleventh Amendment on a par with other forms of subject-mat­
ter jurisdiction, and the further admonition that the "court must ex­
amine" each claim before it determines the claim's status under the 
Amendment mandates the raising of the issue on the court's own 
motion.235 
If the Amendment operates as a barrier to the subject-matter 
jurisdiction of the federal courts, as Pennhurst indicates, the posi­
tion of the bright-line courts is strengthened. Since a court would 
have no authority to decide a case against a state officer unless the 
suit was brought against the officer in his individual capacity, a 
231. Patsy v. Bd. of Regents of Fla., 457 U.S. 496, 515-16 n.19 (1982). 
232. [d. at 516 n.19. This was a § 1983 case that was decided without reference to 
the Eleventh Amendment. Though there were potential Eleventh Amendment issues 
in the case, these issues had not been argued or briefed by the parties at any stage of the 
trial or appeal process. The Court's footnote seems to be offering an explanation for 
the appearance that the Court is ignoring the elephant in the room. 
233. Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 465 U.S. 89, 119 (1984) (quot­
ing Missouri v. Fiske, 290 U.S. 18, 25 (1933)). 
234. [d. at 121. 
235. [d. (emphasis added). Elsewhere in the opinion, the Court characterizes the 
Eleventh Amendment as an "exemplification" in the Constitution's text of the underly­
ing doctrine of sovereign immunity. [d. at 98-99 (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 
490, 497 (1921)). The doctrine itself is incorporated into the Constitution on a struc­
tural and historical level, according to the Court, hence, "the principle of sovereign 
immunity is a constitutional limitation on the federal judicial power established in Art. 
III." [d. at 98. The right of a sovereign state not to be sued without its consent is so 
fundamental and had such a powerful bearing on the framing of the Constitution that 
the entire judicial power granted by the Constitution does not embrace au­
thority to entertain a suit brought by private parties against a State without 
consent given: not one brought by citizens of another State, or by citizens or 
subjects of a foreign State, because of the Eleventh Amendment; and not even 
one brought by its own citizens, because of the fundamental rule of which the 
Amendment is but an exemplification. 
[d. at 98-99 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Ex parte New York, 256 U.S. 490, 497 (1921)). 
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statement in the complaint to that effect would be necessary under 
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a). 
But the Fourth Circuit's contention that the Amendment oper­
ates as a "block" on subject- matter jurisdiction that would other­
wise be present finds some support in the Pennhurst decision as 
well. In the same discussion referenced above, the Court states that 
the Amendment "deprives a federal court of power to decide cer­
tain claims against states that otherwise would be within the scope 
of Article Ill's grant of jurisdiction."236 The Court used § 1983 as 
an example, asserting that even a claim of violation of a constitu­
tional right, brought pursuant to § 1983, would be barred by the 
Eleventh Amendment if brought against a state.237 This is so de­
spite the fact that the claim arises under the Constitution and the 
federal courts have jurisdiction over such claims pursuant to Article 
III and 28 U.S.c. § 1331.238 
If the Amendment operates more as a block on jurisdiction 
than a denial of jurisdiction altogether, it would be closer in nature 
to personal, rather than subject-matter jurisdiction. Personal juris­
diction may be waived by a party who appears and defends a suit, 
and the court is under no call to raise the matter on its own.239 The 
question would thus lose the threshold nature it has under the 
bright line view and become more akin to an affirmative defense. 
The Court's statements in both Patsy and Pennhurst are dicta 
and therefore have led to some disagreement in the courts of ap­
peals as to the proper rule.240 Moreover, the Supreme Court in two 
more recent cases issued further contradictory statements regarding 
the nature of the Eleventh Amendment as a jurisdictional bar.241 
236. Id. 119-20. 
237. Id. at 120. 
238. Section 1331 provides, "The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
all civil actions arising under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the United States." 
239. See Ins. Corp. of Ir. v. Compagnie des Bauxites de Guinee, 456 U.S. 694, 
702-03 (1982). 
The requirement that a court have personal jurisdiction flows not from Art. 
III, but from the Due Process Clause. The personal jurisdiction requirement 
recognizes and protects an individual liberty interest. It represents a restric­
tion on judicial power not as a matter of sovereignty, but as a matter of indi­
vidual liberty . . . . Because the requirement of personal jurisdiction 
represents first of all an individual right, it can, like other such rights, be 
waived. 
Id. 
240. See Keith, supra note 230, at 1049, 1077 (concluding that "[t]he Pennhurst 
standard is both preferable as a matter of policy and more accurate as a matter of 
present Eleventh Amendment jurisprudence"). 
241. Compare Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996), with Wis. 
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Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida242 used much of the same 
language found in Pennhurst to declare that the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts did not include suits against non-consenting states.243 
This seemed to place the Eleventh Amendment and the underlying 
principles of sovereign immunity squarely in the category of sub­
ject-matter jurisdiction and largely to nullify the Patsy footnote. 244 
Two years later, however, the Court resurrected the Patsy foot­
note in a unanimous opinion that made no mention of Seminole 
Tribe.245 In deciding the question of the effect of the Eleventh 
Amendment on the removal jurisdiction of the federal courts, the 
Court stated that the original jurisdiction of the federal courts is not 
necessarily destroyed by the Amendment.246 
Rather, the Eleventh Amendment grants the State a legal power 
to assert a sovereign immunity defense should it choose to do so. 
The State can waive the defense. Nor need a court raise the de­
fect on its own. Unless the State raises the matter, a court can 
ignore it.247 
According to this definition, the Eleventh Amendment takes 
on almost the same attributes as any other affirmative defense.248 
It is up to the defendant to raise the defense and the court is under 
no obligation to take up the matter on its own. 
On balance, however, the weight of the Supreme Court's ex­
Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998). For a more detailed analysis of these 
two cases see Keith, supra note 230, at 1066-7l. 
242. 517 U.S. 44 (1996). 
243. See id. at 64. 
244. Keith, supra note 230, at 1068. 
245. Wis. Dep't of Corr. v. Schacht, 524 U.S. 381 (1998); see Keith, supra note 
230, at 1069. 
246. Schacht, 524 U.S. at 389. 
247. Id. (citations omitted). 
248. The word "almost" is used here because, unlike other defenses which are 
deemed waived if not raised at the outset or made in a motion, FED. R. CIv. P. 12(b), a 
state's Eleventh Amendment immunity can be raised at any time. This creates the pos­
sibility that a state may assert the Eleventh Amendment on appeal, even though not 
asserted at trial, and have any judgment rendered against it reversed or vacated for lack 
of jurisdiction. The unfairness of this circumstance concerned Justice Kennedy, who 
expressed his "doubts about the propriety of this rule" in his concurring opinion in 
Schacht: 
In permitting the belated assertion of the Eleventh Amendment bar, we allow 
States to proceed to judgment without facing any real risk of adverse conse­
quences. Should the State prevail, the plaintiff would be bound by principles 
of res judicata. If the State were to lose, however, it could void the entire 
judgment simply by asserting its immunity on appeal. 
Schacht, 524 U.S. at 394 (Kennedy, J., concurring). 
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isting precedent and dicta regarding the Eleventh Amendment 
comes down against the proposition that the Eleventh Amendment 
is not truly a jurisdictional barrier. To be sure, the Amendment 
operates differently than other subject-matter jurisdiction limits. 
This can be seen in the fact that jurisdiction may be had if the state 
consents to suit. 
But this ability of the states to consent flows from their nature 
as sovereigns in the federal system. It should not be held to detract 
from the effect of the Amendment on the authority of the federal 
courts to entertain suits by private parties against a state. Under 
our federal system, the individual states "retain 'a residuary and 
inviolable sovereignty.' "249 Although their authority is curtailed by 
their entrance into the Union under the Constitution, the states 
themselves do not become organs of the federal government. 
Rather, they "retain the dignity ... of sovereignty."25o It is part of 
the nature of its retained sovereignty that a state cannot be made 
amenable to suit by an individual without its consent.251 It would 
seem no less an infringement of that sovereignty to declare that a 
state may not so consent. Rather than being viewed as a demon­
stration of how Eleventh Amendment immunity is not jurisdic­
tional, the ability of a state to consent is more properly seen as 
simply a manifestation of its status as a residual sovereign. 
Moreover, the statements in Patsy and Schacht notwithstand­
ing, the proposition that the judicial power of the United States 
does not, and never did, extend to private suits against the states is 
one that the Court has expressed since 1890.252 If this is the correct 
view, then the issue of state immunity becomes a threshold matter 
and absent a showing that jurisdiction exists, a federal court cannot 
proceed. This view mandates that a court address possible sover­
eign immunity problems on its own motion. This in turn supports 
the Eighth Circuit's reading of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(a) 
requiring the plaintiff to state that the defendant is being sued in his 
individual capacity. 
249. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (quoting THE FEDERALIST No. 39 
(James Madison». 
250. Id. 
251. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 54 (1996). 
252. Id. "For over a century we have reaffirmed that federal jurisdiction over 
suits against unconsenting States 'was not contemplated by the Constitution when es­
tablishing the judicial power of the United States.'" Id. (quoting Hans v. Louisiana, 134 
U.S. 1, 15 (1890) and citing twenty-four subsequent cases in support). 
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B. The Disagreement as a Misapplication of Will 
In instances where the defendant is a state officer, both the 
bright-line courts and the course-of-proceedings courts discuss ca­
pacity pleading requirements in the context of the Eleventh 
Amendment.253 However, the relevant Supreme Court precedent 
indicates that the Eleventh Amendment does not matter-at least 
not as much as it would seem from the opinions of the U.S. courts 
of appeals. 
When the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit adopted the 
bright-line standard expounded by the Eighth Circuit, it relied pri­
marily on the Supreme Court's decision in Will v. Michigan Depart­
ment of State Police.254 The Sixth Circuit characterized the Will 
decision, as the Eighth Circuit had previously, as holding that "state 
officials sued in [their] official capacity for damages are absolutely 
immune from liability under the Eleventh Amendment."255 Will, 
however, was not an Eleventh Amendment case. Will's holding 
was that the word "persons," as used in § 1983, does not include the 
states.256 Since state agents sued in their official capacities are 
deemed to be "the state" as well, such agents, when sued officially, 
are not "persons" under § 1983 either.257 
The Will Court's reasoning in reaching these conclusions is 
based in substantial part on Eleventh Amendment considerations, 
but the decision itself is more a matter of statutory construction 
253. See, e.g., Reames v. Oklahoma ex rei. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 
1164, 1168 (10th Cir. 2005), cert. denied, No. 05-807,2006 U.S. LEXIS 1994 (U.S. Feb. 
27, 2006). "The Eleventh Amendment does not prevent plaintiffs from bringing suits 
against state officials ... in their individual and personal capacities." Id. However, after 
applying the course-of-proceedings test, the court found this plaintiff's suit to be against 
the state and "therefore money damages [were] barred under the Eleventh Amend­
ment." Id.; see also Murphy v. Arkansas, 127 F.3d 750, 754 (8th Cir. 1997) ("[T]he 
Eleventh Amendment does not bar damage claims against state officials acting in their 
personal capacities."); Biggs v. Meadows, 66 F.3d 56, 60 (4th Cir. 1995) ("The minority 
view neglects the considerable differences between Eleventh Amendment immunity 
and federal jurisdiction."); Pride v. Does, 997 F.2d 712, 715 (10th Cir. 1993) ("It is well­
settled that the Eleventh Amendment bars § 1983 civil actions against the states but 
permits such suits brought against state officials sued in their individual capacities."); 
Wells v. Brown, 891 F.2d 591, 593 (6th Cir. 1989) ("[T]he Eleventh Amendment places 
a jurisdictional limit on federal courts in civil rights cases against states and state em­
ployees ...."). 
254. Wells, 891 F.2d at 592. 
255. Id. 
256. Will v. Mich. Dep't of State Police, 491 U.S. 58, 71 (1989) ("We hold that 
neither a State nor its officials acting in their official capacities are 'persons' under 
§ 1983."). 
257. Id. 
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than constitutional explication.258 The courts of appeals therefore 
miss the mark in conducting the capacity debate solely on Eleventh 
Amendment terms. 
The effect of Will is that neither suits against states nor official­
capacity suits for damages against state officers may go forward 
under § 1983-not because of the Eleventh Amendment, but be­
cause the statute does not provide for such a claim.259 In contrast, 
the dissenting Justices would have held that states are, in fact, "per­
sons" within the meaning of § 1983.260 Under this alternative, the 
states would still enjoy immunity from suit, but could nevertheless 
consent to being sued. Under the majority's holding, a state could 
never itself be held liable for civil rights violations. Justice Bren­
nan, writing in dissent and joined by Justices Marshall, Blackmun, 
and Stevens, stated, 
[A description of the far-reaching impact] of the Court's holding 
... demonstrate[s] its unwisdom. If states are not "persons" 
within the meaning of § 1983, then they may not be sued under 
that statute regardless of whether they have consented to suit. 
Even if . . . a State formally and explicitly consented to suits 
against it in federal or state court, no § 1983 plaintiff could pro­
ceed against it because States are not within the statute's cate­
gory of possible defendants.261 
For the dissenting Justices, a holding that would invalidate the 
express consent of a state to be sued was incongruent with the prin­
ciples of sovereignty and federalism that underlie Eleventh Amend­
ment doctrine.262 This is intuitive-if a state's immunity from suit is 
an attendant part of its sovereign status, the corollary ability to con­
sent to suit would seem to be no less a part of that status. Thus, a 
holding that nullifies a state's consent represents no less an infringe­
ment of state sovereignty than did the Chisholm holding in 1793.263 
258. The majority looks at the statutory language and legislative history of § 1983, 
but according to Justice Brennan's dissent does not do a thorough job of either. Id. at 
72 (Brennan, J., dissenting). Justice Brennan suggests that the majority wrongfully ap­
plies Eleventh Amendment standards of deciphering legislative intent in a case where 
the Amendment is not implicated (this was a pre-Alden, state-court action). Id. at 75­
76. Brennan flatly disagrees with the majority's holding, finding that the 42d Congress 
did intend to include states in the definition of "persons" under § 1983. Id. at 77. 
259. Id. at 71 (majority opinion). 
260. [d. at 77 (Brennan, J., dissenting); id. at 93-94 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
261. Id. at 85 (Brennan, J., dissenting). 
262. [d. at 86. 
263. As earlier stated, supra text accompanying note 22, Chisholm v. Georgia 
allowed a private citizen to sue the State of Georgia for the recovery of debts incurred 
during the Revolutionary War and led directly to the drafting and ratification of the 
2006] IS IT THE OFFICER OR THE GENTLEMAN? 365 

In discussing pleading requirements on Eleventh Amendment 
terms, the courts of appeals are necessarily assuming that § 1983 
has the potential to bring a state government or state officer within 
its reach. Close adherence to the Will holding, that states and offi­
cially-sued state officers are not within the statute's ambit, would 
foreclose the need to consider the question on constitutional 
grounds. These courts are going beyond the question of whether 
states are "persons" to reach the question of whether the Eleventh 
Amendment removes such a case from the jurisdiction of the fed­
eral courts. 
Only if states were, in fact, "persons" under § 1983 would it 
become necessary to determine the jurisdictional effect of the Elev­
enth Amendment. As noted by the majority in Alden, Will's "hold­
ing that 42 U.S.c. § 1983 did not create a cause of action against the 
states rendered it unnecessary to determine the scope of the States' 
constitutional immunity from suit in their own courtS."264 The fact 
that Will originated in a state court system does not matter here. 
The Court's construction of § 1983 is applicable regardless of 
whether the claim is brought in federal or state court. The category 
of "persons" to whom the statute applies should not vary depending 
on forum. Such a variance would give rise to a situation wherein a 
state could consent to be sued in federal court, but be precluded 
from doing so in its own courts. If, as stated by Alden, the fact that 
the statute does not create a cause of action against states makes it 
unnecessary in the state court context to consider the issue on sov­
ereign immunity grounds, the same should hold true in federal 
court. Thus, in reaching the sovereign immunity discussion, the ap­
proach of the courts of appeals seems more in line with the reason­
ing of the dissenting opinions in Will, rather than the holding of the 
majority.265 
Under Will, a § 1983 suit against a state or against a state of­
ficer in his official capacity would be subject to dismissal because 
the statute does not provide a remedy. Therefore, the strict re-
Eleventh Amendment. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793), superseded by statute, U.S. CONST. 
amend. XI, as recognized in Hans v. Louisiana, 134 U.S. 1 (1890). 
264. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,736 (1999). 
265. Justice Stevens, in a separate dissent, points out the logical discord caused by 
the Will holding: 
The Court having constructed an edifice for the purposes of the Eleventh 
Amendment on the theory that the State is always the real party in interest in 
a § 1983 official-capacity action against a state officer, I would think the ma­
jority would be impelled to conclude that the State is a "person" under § 1983. 
Will, 491 U.S. at 93 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
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quirements of the Eighth Circuit again are justified, though for dif­
ferent reasons. The only way, under Will, for a § 1983 plaintiff to 
recover damages against a state officer is to sue that officer in his 
individual capacity. Otherwise, the plaintiff will have failed to 
make a "statement of the claim showing that [she] is entitled to 
relief."266 
CONCLUSION 
Whether the reasons are constitutional or statutory, it is neces­
sary that a § 1983 plaintiff seeking damages make clear that he is 
suing the defendant in the defendant's individual capacity. How­
ever, in light of the premium the Federal Rules place on the adjudi­
cation of claims on their merits, it seems unduly harsh to require 
the plaintiff to make an express statement to that effect or face dis­
missal. Looking instead to the nature of the claims, the defenses, 
and the course of proceedings appears more equitable, particularly 
in the case of a pro se plaintiff like Robert Biggs. 
Nevertheless, the course-of-proceedings approach goes too far. 
It seems unlikely that any plaintiff would be found to have intended 
to sue the defendant solely in her official capacity, since to do so 
would be litigation suicide.267 Further, allowing an examination of 
the defenses raised in response to the complaint can be misleading 
because affirmative defenses are often perfunctorily inserted into 
an answer, whether applicable or not, in order to ensure the de­
fense is not waived. 
Likewise, looking to the direction the litigation has taken will 
tend to lead to an individual capacity conclusion. Whether a gov­
ernment official is sued individually or officially, he is still a person 
(though perhaps not a § 1983 "person") and the course of proceed­
266. FED. R. ClV. P. 8(a)(2). 
267. See John C. Jeffries, Jr., In Praise of the Eleventh Amendment and Section 
1983, 84 VA. L. REv. 47, 63-65 (1998). Professor Jeffries's survey of cases from 1991 
through 1997 found that suits against state officers where capacity was left ambiguous 
were "generally allowed ... to proceed. . . . Almost never did the courts refuse to 
accept a properly pleaded complaint by coercively recharacterizing the complaint as 
being 'really' against the state and therefore barred by the Eleventh Amendment." Id. 
But see Reames v. Oklahoma ex rei. Okla. Health Care Auth., 411 F.3d 1164, 1168 (10th 
Cir. 2005) (applying course-of-proceedings analysis to § 1983 claims against employees 
of two state agencies and finding the suit to be against the defendants in their official 
capacity and properly dismissed on Eleventh Amendment grounds); United States ex 
reI. Adrian v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 363 F.3d 398, 402-03 (5th Cir. 2004) (reach­
ing the same result in application of course-of-proceedings analysis to action brought 
under False Claims Act). 
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ings will almost certainly be replete with references to the official as 
an individual, from which a court could determine that the plaintiff 
intended to sue him as such and that the defendant knew he was 
being so sued. 
In short, the course-of-proceedings approach, while perhaps 
founded on good intentions, is standardless and easily manipulated. 
When capacity is left ambiguous in the complaint, the inquiry 
should be confined to the four corners of the complaint. Within 
those four corners, however, the complaint should be read substan­
tively, rather than be held fatally deficient for lack of a certain sen­
tence or formulation. This will ensure that federal courts remain 
within their statutory and constitutional boundaries, while still af­
fording the unclear plaintiff the fairness our system requires. 
Jeffrey K. O'Connor* 
* My deepest thanks to my loved ones, colleagues, and teachers. Their support, 
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ruary 28, 2006. 
